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Reviews of Vanuatu and West Papua 
are not included in this issue.
Fiji 
Fiji’s military-backed government 
dug in its heels during 2008, defying 
pressure to hold elections. At home, 
interim Prime Minister Frank Baini-
marama courted popular backing for 
a “People’s Charter” and sought to 
restructure the Great Council of Chiefs 
(gcc). Externally, relations soured fur-
ther with Australia and New Zealand 
over the breach of the commitment to 
hold elections by March 2009, several 
death threats directed at Australian 
High Commissioner James Batley, and 
the expulsion of additional journalists 
and diplomats. The economy fared 
poorly, despite the recommencement 
of gold mining at Vatukoula and some 
recovery in tourist arrivals. The inner 
circle around Bainimarama tight-
ened after the Fiji Labour Party (flp) 
ministers—including party leader 
Mahendra Chaudhry—left the cabinet. 
In October, a panel of three judges 
sitting on the high court in the Qarase 
v Bainimarama case ruled that post-
2006 coup presidential decrees were 
lawful, thus legitimizing the actions of 
the interim government. 
In January 2008, the National 
Council for Building a Better Fiji 
(ncbbf) held its fi rst meeting. Open-
ing the proceedings, Catholic Arch-
bishop Petero Mataca echoed the 
position of his co-chair Frank Baini-
marama by rejecting calls for a speedy 
return to the polls on the grounds that 
“elections alone will not bring about 
democracy nor guarantee stability 
or end all coups” (Fiji Times, 18 Jan 
2008). His statement set the tone for 
what became the core ncbbf mes-
sage—an insistence on far-reaching 
electoral reforms to eliminate rac-
ism recycled as justifi cation for the 
regime’s resisting pressure to hold 
fresh elections by March 2009. Invita-
tions to join the council were refused 
by deposed Prime Minister Qarase’s 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
(sdl) party and the Methodist 
Church, indicating that the majority 
of indigenous Fijians remained deeply 
opposed to the interim government’s 
initiatives. Both of the major North 
Indian organizations, the Arya Samaj 
and the Shree Sanatan Dharm Pra-
tinidhi Sabha, took up seats on the 
national council. So too did Mahendra 
Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party, which 
had been backed by the vast major-
ity of Fiji Indians at the elections two 
years previously. A small but vocal 
minority of Fiji Indians remained 
aloof; the National Federation Party 
refused to participate, as did the main 
South Indian organization, the Then 
India Sanmarga Ikya Sangam, and the 
Fiji Muslim League. In response, the 
regime cultivated rival South Indian 
and Muslim groups (for details, see 
Prasad 2009).
The draft People’s Charter, released 
in August, proposed a set of core 
shared values including sustainable 
democracy, a common national iden-
tity, enlightened leadership, poverty 
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reduction, and economic development 
(ncbbf 2008a). Most were grand 
statements of principle that could have 
been embraced, at least rhetorically, by 
all of Fiji’s post-independence govern-
ments, and the document was largely 
silent on concrete steps to be taken. 
A few proposals stood out. “Main-
streaming of indigenous Fijians in a 
modern, progressive Fiji” was to be 
promoted by adoption of a common 
name—“Fijian”—for all citizens (in 
contrast to the more usual everyday 
usage of “Fijian” to refer to the indig-
enous community and “Indian” to 
refer to those descended from migrants 
from the Subcontinent). Indigenous 
Fijians would henceforth be referred 
to as “i-Taukei” rather than “Fijian.” 
That sparked a familiar debate and 
was predictably condemned by Qarase 
and the Methodist Church. In the 
mid-1990s reformists had encour-
aged usage of “Indo-Fijian” for those 
of Indian descent and “Fiji Islander” 
for all Fiji citizens. But those terms 
never caught on in everyday speech 
within Fiji, instead becoming confi ned 
largely to polite liberal and schol-
arly discourse. The new terminology 
is unlikely to acquire any greater 
currency.
The People’s Charter included 
proposals for a radical overhaul of 
the electoral system. The complex 
preferential system used at the elec-
tions of 1999, 2001, and 2006 was 
to be dropped and replaced by an 
open-list, proportional-representa-
tion system, as used in Finland and 
Sri Lanka. Communal constituen-
cies, in which citizens vote separately 
according to ethnic origins, were to 
be replaced by a fully common roll 
system, and the voting age was to be 
reduced from 21 to 18. These were 
sensible proposals, which had been 
backed by many in pre-coup Fiji. The 
trouble was that they were now to be 
introduced under the barrel of a gun, 
with the regime backed by the Repub-
lic of Fiji Military Forces (rfmf) 
urged to do so by Father David Arms 
(a Catholic priest) and others associ-
ated with the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum (Arms 2008). “As the military 
regime [is] more or less acting out-
side the Constitution,” Father Arms 
proposed, “the ncbbf should take 
the opportunity to push through 
the electoral reforms and amend the 
Constitution, by taking advantage of 
the military authority and ignoring the 
legal constitutional requirements for 
making such changes.” The suggestion 
was condemned as “treasonous” by 
former Leader of the Opposition Mick 
Beddoes, who lamented that “men of 
God” were in cahoots with “a mili-
tary Junta, whose actions to date have 
been against the will of the people” 
 (FijiLive, 6 June 2008). 
The multiparty cabinet provision 
in Fiji’s 1997 constitution, entitling all 
parties with over 10 percent of seats to 
participate in the cabinet, was also to 
be dropped. These arrangements had 
not worked well during the 1999–
2000 Chaudhry or 2001–2006 Qarase 
governments. However, after the May 
2006 polls, Qarase had brought nine 
flp members into the cabinet. For the 
fi rst time since independence, both of 
Fiji’s major parties—one representing 
the ethnic Fijians and the other the Fiji 
Indians—were cooperating together in 
government. In the rfmf newsletter, 
Bainimarama had applauded “the evo-
lution of this great and new concept 
of power sharing at the executive level 
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of government” and demanded “total 
support to the multi-party cabinet 
from each and every member of the 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces” 
(Mataivalu News, July /August 2006, 
3). In practice, the arrangement turned 
out to be fraught with diffi culty. 
Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhry 
had stayed out, seeking at fi rst to 
retain the opposition leader’s offi ce, 
then later protesting about the absence 
of clear “ground rules” for cabinet 
deliberations, and eventually publicly 
denouncing his colleagues for col-
laborating with Qarase. On the eve of 
the 2006 coup, Chaudhry insisted that 
flp ministers follow the party whip 
and vote against the government’s 
budget, while Qarase demanded col-
lective responsibility on the part of the 
cabinet. Had that experience shown 
that power sharing was unwork-
able, as many in Fiji and Australia 
argued? Was the weak design of the 
power-sharing laws—which had been 
belatedly inserted into the otherwise 
Westminster-based 1997 constitu-
tion—responsible? Most in Fiji blamed 
the politicians and the soldiers, not the 
design of the institutions. 
From the coup-makers’ standpoint, 
the National Council for Building a 
Better Fiji was a legitimizing device, 
and a convenient means for separat-
ing collaborators from critics. It also 
provided a sense of purpose and 
direction that was otherwise lack-
ing. For some civil society groups, the 
national council offered a platform for 
the advancement of laudable objec-
tives—such as electoral reform, or just 
treatment for the poor and disadvan-
taged. Director of the ncbbf Techni-
cal Secretariat, John Samy, told view-
ers of Fiji tv’s Close Up in January 
that he did not support the coup but 
wanted to provide an ”exit strategy” 
for the commander and his Fiji mili-
tary forces.  Yet Samy, like the Catholic 
archbishop, accepted that the military 
had every right to reshape Fiji’s future, 
and that the country’s elected leaders 
and political parties could reasonably 
be blackmailed—under the threat of 
continued military control—into sign-
ing the charter. 
ncbbf moderates urged that if 
the People’s Charter was to halt the 
“coup culture” some discussion of 
the rfmf role was necessary. To this, 
the commander happily acquiesced: 
the terms of reference for the working 
group on this matter urged extensive 
rfmf involvement in government 
deliberations on matters “related to 
national security” (ncbbf 2008b). 
The fi nal document notably dropped 
that suggestion, proposing instead that 
the Fiji military be “answerable to the 
government and parliament in accor-
dance with our Constitution” (ncbbf 
2008a, 7). This was an achievement 
heralded by some as a major triumph 
(see, eg,  FijiLive, 8 Aug 2008). In 
other respects, the charter embraced 
fashionable military phraseology; it 
urged that a “holistic approach to 
human security be adopted by our 
security forces” (ncbbf 2008a, 8), 
and that this approach fi gure centrally 
in a “changing role for the rfmf that 
brings it closer to the people” (ncbbf 
2008a, 37). It aimed to “enhance the 
rfmf-community development part-
nership by strengthening its develop-
mental role to ensure that its profes-
sional, technical and social potential is 
fully realised”—a role that was to be 
achieved through an “expanded engi-
neering corps,” provision of “security 
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services,” biodiversity conservation, 
infrastructure rehabilitation, and 
engagement in youth training pro-
grams (ncbbf 2008a, 16).
Public outreach consultations to 
ascertain support for the charter 
were launched in August, with plans 
to cover two-thirds of the adult Fiji 
population. Bainimarama said that 
he intended to change Fiji’s constitu-
tion, but both he and John Samy fl atly 
rejected recalling Fiji’s Parliament, 
despite this being the only constitu-
tional route for enactment of their 
reforms. Instead, a President’s Forum 
convened with Commonwealth and 
United Nations assistance would, 
the commander hoped, encourage 
stakeholders to agree to the charter. 
To demonstrate a commitment to 
dialogue, Bainimarama held talks with 
Qarase over draunimoli (lemon leaf 
tea), brokered by the Catholic and 
Methodist churches. In October, he 
arranged a preliminary dialogue for 
registered political parties intended 
to set the agenda for the President’s 
Forum, which was opened with the 
bald threat that, unless consensus 
emerged around the commander’s 
favored reform program, there would 
be a protracted delay before the next 
election (Fiji Times, 28 Oct 2008). 
Initial reports indicated negligible 
turnout around the country at the 
meetings that were being organized 
to solicit support for the charter, 
a verdict confi rmed by the exten-
sion of the deadline for completion 
of consultations from October to 
December. Belatedly alerted to the 
popularity battle being lost, the 
ncbbf Secretariat countered that 
a strongly favorable response was 
being conveyed through the divisional 
commissioners. The organs of state 
were now extensively mobilized in a 
nationwide propaganda campaign. 
Stories emerged of undue pressure on 
civil servants, including police and 
schoolteachers (see, eg, Fiji Sun, 3 
Sept 2008). Fiji tv showed interviews 
with youths in Suva who had been 
cajoled into signing forms they found 
out only later to be endorsements of 
the charter (Fiji tv, 16 Nov 2008). 
Conversely, i-Taukei ncbbf members 
condemned the Methodist Church for 
soliciting signatures against the charter 
(Vesikula and Tabakaucoro 2008). 
While the Methodist Church general 
secretary, the Reverend Tuikilakila 
Waqairatu, insisted that 80 percent 
of his fellow Methodists opposed the 
charter, Bainimarama countered that 
92.5 percent of the wider population 
backed it. When Bainimarama’s fi gures 
were ridiculed, the interim government 
issued a clarifi cation that 80 percent 
(424,660) of the Fiji population ages 
eighteen and older (533,782) had 
been consulted. Of these, 372,311 had 
completed response forms. Of these, 
92 percent had affi rmed support for 
the charter, 3 percent had requested 
changes, and 4.4 percent had rejected 
it. The government press release con-
cluded that 64.2 percent supported the 
charter (Fiji Government 2008). Even 
the adjusted fi gures were not credible. 
Claims of overwhelming support 
for the charter sat oddly alongside the 
interim government’s reluctance to 
hold elections, which notably sharp-
ened over the course of the year. In 
October 2007, Bainimarama had com-
mitted himself to elections by March 
2009 before a Pacifi c Islands Forum 
summit in Tonga. A joint Forum–Fiji 
Government working group had been 
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entrusted with plotting further steps 
along the agreed roadmap toward the 
scheduled polls, and working through 
the various technical obstacles that 
both sides agreed stood in the way of 
fresh elections (for a critique of this 
view, see Fraenkel 2009). A popula-
tion census was allegedly needed, and 
constituency boundaries had to be 
redrawn, although the interim gov-
ernment showed few signs of haste 
in accomplishing these tasks, despite 
pressure exerted by Pacifi c Islands 
Forum Ministerial Contact Group 
visits in July and December. Similarly, 
there was little urgency in arrang-
ing talks with political parties or in 
preparing for the promised President’s 
Forum. Criticism of the electoral dead-
line became a popular mantra among 
the regime’s supporters, who urged 
that elections could not be held until 
the end of the hurricane season or the 
school holidays. That the real reasons 
were political, not technical, Bainima-
rama himself made clear: “we want to 
have an election,” he said in one of his 
unscripted remarks, “but we want to 
have an election on my terms so that 
we can cut out the coup mentality” 
(Fiji Times, 31 May 2008). 
An explicit public repudiation of 
the electoral commitment to the Pacifi c 
Islands Forum came in July and was 
transparently linked to an effort to 
play the European Union (EU) and the 
Commonwealth against the allegedly 
Australia / New Zealand–dominated 
Pacifi c Islands Forum. Aware that a 
European Troika mission was due to 
visit, the commander publicly broke 
off linkages with the Forum working 
group. Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-
Khaiyum extolled the virtues of the 
EU mission as “more fl exible,” “more 
facilitative,” and “more engaging part-
ners” (Fiji Times, 20 June 2008). But 
the new enthusiasm for Euro-Pacifi c 
diplomacy proved short-lived. In July, 
Sayed-Khaiyum condemned the EU 
mission for inappropriately focus-
ing on the election timetable  (Fiji tv 
News, 14 July 2008). Commonwealth 
envoy Sir Paul Reeves arrived in Fiji 
and came close to successfully bro-
kering negotiations, but his efforts 
were also eventually rejected, and 
other, more sympathetic interlocutors 
sought. In August, Bainimarama boy-
cotted the Pacifi c Islands Forum meet-
ing in Niue, where leaders threatened 
to suspend Fiji unless the agreed elec-
tion timetable was met.  The interim 
prime minister now insisted that there 
would be no elections until a new 
 constitution, incorporating the Peo-
ple’s Charter, was in place (FijiLive, 
25 Aug 2008). 
Fiji’s post-coup political landscape 
was transformed in 2008 by the 
departure of Mahendra Chaudhry and 
his Fiji Labour Party from the cabinet. 
In January, Chaudhry’s position had 
appeared to be consolidated, when 
a reshuffl e saw the sacking, among 
several others, of Poseci Bune, who 
was known to have fought with the 
flp leader. Tom Ricketts entered the 
cabinet, bringing the number of flp 
ministers to three. Chaudhry now held 
an impressive array of portfolios—
fi nance, national planning, the sugar 
industry, and public utilities—and was 
seen by many as the de facto prime 
minister. But the triumph was to prove 
short-lived. In February, a report 
commissioned by Chaudhry, which 
recommended the de-reservation of 
indigenous-owned lands (Krishna-
murthi 2008), generated an outcry, 
342 the contemporary pacifi c • 21:2 (2009)
echoing the land controversies during 
the 1999–2000 government. Although 
Chaudhry distanced himself from the 
report, by midyear he was confi dently 
assuring members of his National 
Farmers’ Union in Labasa that the 
government intended to provide them 
with fi fty-year leases on native-owned 
lands (Fiji tv, 1 June 2008). 
Other controversies threatened to 
be more damaging. Since mid-2007, 
Fiji’s newspapers had been report-
ing allegations of tax evasion by an 
undisclosed minister. In February, 
the Fiji Times named that minister 
as Chaudhry, sparking a f$1 billion 
(us$650 million) lawsuit in which 
the flp leader’s lawyers listed Fiji 
Times owner Rupert Murdoch’s News 
International among the respondents. 
The claims stemmed from United 
Kingdom–based journalist, Victor 
Lal. As correspondent for the Fiji Sun, 
Lal alleged that a$1.6 million (us$1 
million) had been deposited in bank 
accounts in Chaudhry’s name dur-
ing 2000–2002 (some by the Indian 
consul general in Sydney), and that 
interest on those earnings had not 
been declared to the Fiji Islands Cus-
toms and Revenue Authority (firca) 
(Lal 2008b). The money, it turned out, 
had come from India, and comprised 
donations made in the wake of the 
deposed 1999–2000 prime minister’s 
world tour after the coup of May 
2000. 
A scandal was inevitable. Before 
Parliament in 2005, Chaudhry had 
been grilled about the whereabouts 
of money collected on his 2000 
voyages and had denied knowledge 
of any such payments (Chaudhry 
2005). The bank records obtained by 
the Fiji newspapers, however, sug-
gested substantial withdrawals from 
2001 onward. Under investigation, 
Chaudhry had supplied firca with a 
letter written in September 2004 by 
one Harbhajan Lal, which purported 
to be a response to a query by the flp 
leader as to the whereabouts of the 
money: “Respected Chaudhry Saheb, 
Nameste. We are hale and hearty here 
and please accept our good wishes. I 
received your letter. You have asked 
for details of the funds. You may 
recall that when you were here in the 
year 2000, we had formed a com-
mittee, which requested you to leave 
Fiji and stay in Australia since the 
situation in Fiji was not safe and you 
were not secure there. The committee 
also assured you that it would collect 
funds for your settlement in Australia” 
(quoted in Lal 2008a).
This correspondence was, at 
the very least, peculiar: Why was 
Chaudhry inquiring about funds in 
2004 that he had been withdrawing 
since 2001? And was it, as the letter 
alleged, accurate that popular fund-
raising in India had been intended to 
assist the Labour leader to relocate 
to Australia in the wake of the 2000 
coup, rather than—as most in Fiji 
believed—to assist displaced Indian 
farmers evicted during the turmoil 
after George Speight’s coup? 
The plot thickened further when it 
was revealed that two firca offi cials 
tasked with investigating Chaudhry’s 
tax fi les had been dismissed in June 
2007 (Fiji Times, 23 Feb 2008). One 
of the sacked offi cials, Lepani Rabo, 
told the media that military offi cers 
were now encouraging him to speak 
out  (FijiLive, 23 Feb 2008). With 
the controversy at last public, Fiji’s 
shadowy Military Council urged that 
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Chaudhry step aside, until proven 
innocent. The interim government 
belatedly agreed to a firca investiga-
tion. But the terms of reference were 
so narrowly constructed—focused 
on whether firca had conducted 
its inquiries on the matter properly, 
not whether Chaudhry had lied to 
Parliament in 2005 or misappropri-
ated funds donated to Fiji’s Indian 
community—that the outcome was 
predictably a whitewash. The inquiry 
team even accepted that the three-time 
fi nance minister was unaware of firca 
procedures for handling interest pay-
ments on overseas deposits. Through 
all of this, Chaudhry issued no media 
statement attempting to reconcile 
his tax records with his  statement to 
Parliament or explaining to his flp 
supporters the reason for his personal 
acquisition of donations collected in 
India after the 2000 coup. In the short 
run, the flp faithful rallied around 
their embattled leader. In the longer 
run, his image was inevitably tar-
nished. A Times-Tebbutt opinion poll 
in early 2009 suggested that many Fiji 
Indians had transferred allegiances 
to the rfmf commander, while most 
 ethnic Fijians remained loyal to 
Qarase (Fiji Times, 21 Feb 2009). 
Chaudhry’s position was made 
more precarious by the fact that, as 
fi nance minister, he was presiding over 
a severe austerity package, rendered 
necessary by the post-coup slowdown. 
Fiji’s gross domestic product con-
tracted sharply in 2007, largely due to 
falling tourist earnings, weak perfor-
mance in the sugar industry, and the 
closure of the country’s gold mine at 
Vatukoula on Viti Levu. Reserve Bank 
estimates of the depth of the 2007 
contraction grew steadily worse: fi rst 
-2.5 percent (rbf, March 2007); then 
-3.1 percent (rbf, June 2007); -3.9 
percent (rbf, Dec 2007); -4.4 percent 
(rbf, March 2008); and fi nally -6.6 
percent (rbf, July 2008). Growth in 
the gross domestic product for 2008, 
initially anticipated at 2.2 percent 
(rbf, Dec 2007), was downgraded 
to around 1 percent by the end of the 
2008, after the anz Bank suggested 
that the Fiji’s Reserve Bank predic-
tions were too optimistic (anz Bank 
2008). Severe declines were evident 
in most sectors, but construction was 
particularly badly hit. Fiji Islands 
Bureau of Statistics data covering 
building permits issued, and comple-
tion certifi cates, suggested that the 
post-crisis rebound in capital invest-
ment—which was expected, following 
the pattern after the 2000 coup—had 
not materialized by the end of 2008 
(fibs 2008b). 
Where there were signs of recovery, 
they were weak. Gold mining recom-
menced in 2008 after the re-opening 
of the Vatukoula mine, but with a 
workforce around a third the size 
of that employed by Emperor Gold 
Mines before its closure in 2006. The 
number of tourists visiting Fiji’s shores 
grew strongly in the second half of 
2008, encouraged by new fl ights from 
Australia by Virgin Blue Airlines. 
However, heavy post-coup discounting 
of package deals ensured that earnings 
remained subdued. Major investments 
initiated prior to the coup had resulted 
in a 16 percent increase in hotel-
bed capacity, rendering the discount 
deals all the more necessary. On the 
other hand, there were major tour-
ism infrastructure casualties. At the 
large Momi Bay resort development 
in southwestern Viti Levu, partially 
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completed bures (Fijian-style thatched 
villas) lay exposed to the elements 
and water had seeped back into the 
drained lagoon. A post-coup shift in 
the interpretation of firca taxation 
rules helped to ruin Bridgecorp, the 
New Zealand company that fi nanced 
the project. The neighboring Natadola 
Beach resort development, which had 
been taken over by new flp-associated 
interim government appointees on the 
board of the Fiji National Provident 
Fund, also suffered setbacks, including 
abandonment of the multimillion-dol-
lar golf course designed by renowned 
Fiji-born golfer Vijay Singh. 
Sugar exports, long purchased by 
the European Union at prices two to 
three times higher than those on the 
open world market, also weakened 
over 2007–2008. In May 2008, British 
company Tate & Lyle announced a 
contractual commitment to purchase 
250,000 –300,000 metric tonnes of 
sugar per annum from Fiji during 
2009–2015. The deal was under the 
terms of the new Economic Partner-
ship Agreement with the European 
Union, signed in December 2007. The 
price paid per metric tonne, initially 
€335.2, is nearly a third lower than 
the 2007 price of €496.8 and is to 
decline toward world market levels 
by 2015 (around €250 at present). (In 
mid-2008, one euro was equivalent 
to approximately us$1.56.) A major 
diffi culty is that the Fiji Sugar Corpo-
ration (fsc) has not been reaching the 
output level of 250,000 metric tonnes, 
and for two years has had to import 
sugar from India to meet domestic and 
Pacifi c Islands demand. The company 
vehemently denies illegal re-exports of 
Indian sugar. fsc Chief Executive Deo 
Saran insists that with import costs 
at f$770 per tonne, and European 
prices around f$950 per tonne, the 
country still earns a sizeable surplus 
by importing Indian sugar (FijiLive, 
10 Oct 2008). The dilemma is that as 
prices decline, growers will logically 
exit the industry, so that reaching the 
250,000-tonne target will become 
increasingly unlikely. Regular break-
downs at the four sugarcane mills, 
and deterioration of cane access roads 
and rail infrastructure, are likely to 
compound those diffi culties. EU aid 
money aimed at assisting rehabilita-
tion of, and diversifi cation away from, 
the sugar industry was cancelled for 
2007 and 2008 as a result of the coup, 
with larger allocations in 2009 and 
2010 conditional on the holding of 
elections. The Fiji Sugar Corporation 
announced a loss of f$19.3 million 
over the fi nancial year ending May 
2008 (FijiLive, 31 Aug 2008).
Even before the coup, the national 
debt had been running at over 
50 percent of the gross domestic 
product. The post-coup slowdown 
and the rescinding of the deposed 
government’s intended increase in 
the value-added tax further damaged 
government fi nances, putting pressure 
on the fi nance minister to rein in the 
state’s annual defi cit, or to urgently 
seek new sources of fi nancial sup-
port—such as the f$230 million loan 
Ambassador to China Jim Ah Koy was 
busily negotiating in Beijing. Judged 
by the 2008 budget fi gures, Chaudhry 
presided over substantial falls in state 
spending during 2007: the public 
sector wage bill fell by 9.7 percent, 
transfer payments by 15.9 percent, 
spending on goods and services by 
28.2 percent, and capital expenditures 
by 44.8 percent (see adb 2008, 235). 
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Nevertheless, interest payments rose 
by 23 percent, and in fact the reported 
9.7 percent wage bill fall stemmed 
largely from the halting of the previ-
ous accounting practice of showing 
value-added tax on wages and salaries 
(see Narsey 2008; Chaudhry 2008). 
Pressure to make savings or to boost 
firca collection of revenues was 
mounting, not least to fund a massive 
coup-related blowout of budgeted 
expenditure on the Fiji military forces 
(see Firth and Fraenkel 2009). It was 
this fi scal dilemma that ultimately led 
to Mahendra Chaudhry’s fall from 
military grace.
In July, Chaudhry imposed export 
duties at twenty cents per liter on 
exports of bottled water, leading the 
ten mineral water export companies 
operating in Fiji to temporarily cease 
production in protest. The largest, 
Natural Waters of Fiji Ltd, had over 
the preceding fi ve years skillfully trans-
formed its bottled artesian water from 
Yaqara in northern Viti Levu into 
a global branding triumph (known 
as Fiji Water), getting its distinctive 
colorful square bottles pictured on 
hit television shows like Ally McBeal, 
The Sopranos, and The West Wing. By 
2008, the company had three hundred 
employees at its Yaqara plant and 
was extracting around 240 million 
liters per annum. Fearful of the risks 
of damaging one of Fiji’s few export 
success stories, the cabinet rescinded 
the measure, severely weakening 
Chaudhry’s position. Fiji’s Military 
Council issued an ultimatum demand-
ing Chaudhry’s resignation, echoing 
its previous response at the time of 
the controversy over the tax evasion 
allegations. Bainimarama departed 
overseas, and rumors spread that 
Chaudhry had been told to clear his 
desk before the commander’s return. 
Seeking to avoid a public sacking, 
Chaudhry sought the support of senior 
flp executives for a resignation of all 
three flp ministers, which—despite 
some reluctance among those who had 
acquired lucrative and powerful posi-
tions in the new order—he eventually 
secured. 
Now outside the cabinet, Chaudhry 
carefully distanced the Fiji Labour 
Party from the 2006 coup, arguing 
that he had joined the interim cabinet 
only because—based on the experi-
ence of previous coups—a speedy 
reversion to constitutional democracy 
was unlikely. Until this point, it had 
been the Labour leader’s son, Rajen-
dra Chaudhry, who had articulated 
flp disenchantment with the regime, 
condemning as “incompetent” the 
Fiji Independent Commission Against 
 Corruption’s investigations into the 
Fiji Sports Council (on which he 
had sat as a board member) and the 
Labour-led Nasinu Municipal Council. 
A public spat with the rfmf media 
spokesman, Major Neumi Leweni, 
culminated in an interview with the 
younger Chaudhry on Fiji tv’s Close 
Up talk show being pulled off the 
air by the police in June. In Octo-
ber, Rajendra Chaudhry attacked 
Bainimarama’s decisions over the 
previous months as “fl awed,” saying 
that a tightening circle of “politi-
cal misfi ts” including Aiyaz Sayed-
 Khaiyum, John Samy, and Parmesh 
Chand was exerting too great an 
infl uence (FijiLive, 7 Oct 2008). That 
insight presumably came from his 
father. The elder Chaudhry’s criticisms 
were more muffl ed; the rupture was 
not yet complete. Nevertheless, out 
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of the cabinet, the Fiji Labour Party 
criticized the “complicated” electoral 
proposals in the People’s Charter and 
rejected the ncbbf objective of abol-
ishing the nineteen Indian communal 
seats (FijiLive, 22 Sept, 19 Sept 2008). 
At times the party even clamored for 
speedy elections, reversing its earlier 
blunt rejections of the allegedly for-
eign-imposed electoral road map.
In mid-2008, the fi rst results of 
the 2007 census of population were 
published by the Fiji Islands Bureau 
of Statistics. These indicated a sub-
stantial demographic shift; whereas 
in the previous census (1996), indig-
enous Fijians had comprised 50.8 
percent of the population and Fiji 
Indians 43.7 percent, the balance was 
now 57.3 percent to 37.6 percent in 
favor of ethnic Fijians. High levels 
of out-migration of Fiji Indians since 
the mid-1980s were responsible. 
Departures had peaked in the wake 
of the 1987 coup. By the mid-1990s, 
continued high Indian emigration was 
mainly responsive to higher standards 
of living available overseas and the 
new possibilities generated by the 
establishment of signifi cant Fiji Indian 
communities in New Zealand, North 
America, and Australia. Indian net 
emigration fl uctuated around 4,500 
per annum during the 1990s, even 
rising slightly during Chaudhry’s year 
in offi ce, suggesting that pull factors 
had become more signifi cant than 
push factors in determining the level 
of annual departures. The 2006 coup 
generated a new spike in Fiji Indian 
out-migration: 8,500 departed dur-
ing 2007, compared to just under 
1,000 ethnic Fijians (fibs 2008a). 
Altogether, the Fiji Indian population 
was 42 percent lower by 2008 than it 
would have been without the exodus 
overseas (as estimated by extrapolat-
ing forward the 1.9 percent growth 
rate witnessed during 1976–1986). 
In tandem with the People’s Char-
ter, the interim government also 
pursued consultation exercises aimed 
at reforming indigenous Fijian cus-
toms and hierarchical structures. A 
three-member review team headed 
by the Tailevu chief, Ratu Tu‘uakitau 
Cakanauto, found its core proposal 
of an “apolitical” role for the Great 
Council of Chiefs ignored. Instead, the 
new fi fty-two-member council was to 
comprise only “traditionally installed” 
chiefs; chiefs who had served as mem-
bers of Parliament or the Senate were 
to be disbarred. The chairman was to 
be the minister of indigenous affairs—
a position held at the time by Commo-
dore Bainimarama—who would also 
control gcc appointments. Cakanauto 
resigned rather than head the sched-
uled follow-up consultation, intended 
to solicit support for the new regula-
tions, saying “it’s not ‘vakaturaga’ 
(chiefl y) to go back to them and pres-
ent something contrary to the discus-
sions we had” (FijiLive, 19 Feb 2008; 
Fiji Times, 20 Feb 2008). “This coup 
is all about dismantling the Fijian 
chiefl y system, customs, traditions 
and their institutions,” concluded Tui 
Namosi and former sdl cabinet minis-
ter Ratu Suliano Matanitobua. “Who 
is the leader of the army to dictate 
the direction and the decisions of the 
gcc?” (Fiji Times, 22 Feb 2008). At 
the annual Methodist conference in 
August, paramount chiefs of the three 
confederacies handed a tabua (whale’s 
tooth) to church leaders applauding 
their leadership in the struggle against 
the People’s Charter.
Some provincial chiefs indicated 
sympathies for the new order. Ratu 
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Tevita Uluilakeba Mara, commander 
of the Third Battalion Fiji Infantry 
Regiment, seized control of the Lau 
Provincial Council in June, after 
ensuring prominent sdl-associated 
rivals were locked out of a meeting on 
the Suva seafront. Ratu Tevita’s father, 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Fiji’s former 
prime minister (1970–1987 and 
1987–1992) and president (1993–
2000), had died in 2004, an event 
viewed by many from those eastern 
and Tongan-infl uenced islands as 
symptomatic of the end of the Lauan 
ascendancy. Now Mara’s dynasty was 
back, and his sons-in-law, Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau and Ratu Epeli Ganilau, 
were in the interim cabinet. Bainima-
rama, himself a “Mara man,” was 
echoing the elitist but moderately mul-
tiracialist themes of his mentor’s Alli-
ance Party. Traditional leaders from 
other provinces (in particular Rotuma, 
Serua, Bua, and Macuata) also sought 
to accommodate the regime. Some 
provinces, like Cakaudrove—where 
bitter opponent of Bainimarama and 
ex-sdl minister Ratu Naiqama Lala-
balavu reigned as Tui Cakau—were 
deeply split. In Ba, in the western part 
of Viti Levu, loyalty to President Tui 
Vuda Ratu Josefa Iloilo encouraged 
some support from the Vuda area, but 
several other prominent western chiefs 
were fi rmly opposed. A regular fi xture 
on Fiji tv’s nightly news shows was 
Ratu Josefa Nawalowalo, who joined 
both the National Council for Build-
ing a Better Fiji and the gcc Review 
team and enthusiastically backed 
the reform program. As a result, he 
lost his chairmanship of the Kadavu 
 Provincial Council. 
The new-look Great Council of 
Chiefs held no meetings in 2008, 
but toward the end of the year, new 
Interim Indigenous Affairs Minister 
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau convened a 
Bose ni Turaga (Council of Chiefs, 
as distinct from the Great Council of 
Chiefs). This was a gathering for the 
lower-rung chiefs, intended to under-
mine the authority of the paramount 
chiefs—such as Ro Teimumu Kepa 
(Rewa), Ratu Inoke Takiveikata (Nai-
tasiri), and Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu 
(Cakaudrove)—who were closely 
associated with the deposed sdl 
government and vigorously opposed 
Bainimarama and his interim gov-
ernment. Held at the army’s Queen 
Elizabeth Barracks in Suva, the gather-
ing brought together one hundred 
twenty-fi ve lower-level chiefs (see Fiji 
Times, 18 Dec 2008) to hear—among 
other things—a presentation from the 
Institute of Fijian Language and Cul-
ture about lack of “common courtesy” 
and “respect” among younger Fijians, 
as well as presentations about hiv, 
appropriate technologies, and fi sher-
ies; they also witnessed rfmf dem-
onstrations of weaponry. While some 
ridiculed the event as an occasion for 
Christmas shopping by village elders 
(FijiLive, 20 Dec 2008), sdl Director 
Peceli Kinivuwai acknowledged that 
“the meeting has effectively driven a 
wedge between our paramount chiefs, 
Turaga I Taukei, and some Turaga ni 
Yavusa” (FijiLive, 19 Dec 2008). That 
Rewa’s recently installed Vunivalu, 
Ro Epeli Mataitini, was present at the 
barracks revealed a schism with the 
Roko Tui Dreketi, Ro Teimumu Kepa, 
who had refused to attend Ro Epeli’s 
installation several months earlier. 
Presence at the Bose ni Turaga, how-
ever, did not necessarily entail support, 
and several of the chiefs at the event 
urged the commander to go back to 
the polls, or beseeched their fellow vil-
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lage elders to preserve Fijian identity 
in the face of the perceived challenge 
from the People’s Charter. 
On 9 October, a year after the 
commencement of deliberations, the 
High Court of Fiji issued a judgment 
in the Qarase v Bainimarama case 
(High Court of Fiji 2008). This was 
the case brought by the deposed prime 
minister against Bainimarama and 
the president, contesting the consti-
tutionality of the post-coup interim 
administration. The panel of three 
presiding judges included acting Chief 
Justice Anthony Gates, Justice John 
Byrne, and Justice Davendra Pathik. 
At the March hearings, the state’s 
lawyers had abandoned the usual 
international arguments intended 
to legitimize coups, for example, in 
Pakistan or Nigeria. Precedents set by 
the 2000 and 2001 Chandrika Prasad 
cases in Fiji (Lautoka High Court 
2000; Court of Appeal 2001)—the 
fi rst of which had been heard by Jus-
tice Gates—rendered such arguments 
impossible. Fiji’s president could 
hardly have been claimed to be acting 
under the “doctrine of necessity” on 
5 December 2006, since he was on 
that day jettisoned from offi ce, and 
when restored in January 2007 he had 
made no attempt to bring back the 
elected government. The other alterna-
tive, an appeal to Kelsen’s theory of 
revolutionary legality (the so-called 
“doctrine of effectiveness”), was also 
an unworkable line of defense—not 
least because the interim govern-
ment claimed that the 1997 constitu-
tion was still intact. Had the 1997 
constitution instead been abrogated, 
it would nevertheless have proved 
impossible for defense lawyers to put 
up a convincing case—following the 
requirements listed in the Chandrika 
Prasad cases—that no alternative gov-
ernment existed or that there existed 
general popular “acquiescence” in the 
post-coup arrangements. 
Instead, state lawyers successfully 
pressed for the bench to ignore any 
question about the legality or oth-
erwise of the 5 December coup. The 
focus was rather to be on the validity 
of rule by presidential decree after 
Ratu Josefa Iloilo was reappointed on 
4 January 2007. The high court found 
that the president had used extraordi-
nary “prerogative powers,” which—
although not explicitly set out in the 
1997 constitution—exist in all Com-
monwealth countries and are available 
for use in exceptional circumstances. 
“We fi nd that exceptional circum-
stances existed, not provided for by 
the Constitution, and that the stability 
of the State was endangered. We also 
fi nd that no other course of action was 
reasonably available, and that such 
action as taken by the President was 
reasonably necessary in the interests of 
peace, order and good government” 
(High Court 2008). 
The decision was widely con-
demned by legal scholars and politi-
cal commentators (see Williams and 
others 2008). The 1997 constitution 
closely specifi es and restricts the 
 powers of the president, rendering 
obsolete the sorts of “reserve powers” 
occasionally found by judges in other 
jurisdictions. “Exceptional circum-
stances” clearly existed, but these had 
arisen due to the military coup and 
could not be reasonably used to justify 
the appointment, as prime minister, 
of the military commander who had 
 carried out that coup. 
While an appeal was set for April 
pol i t ical reviews • melanesia 349
2009, few predicted that it would 
succeed. Fiji’s judiciary had been 
extensively reshaped in the wake of 
the 2006 coup. All six expatriate 
judges on the panel of the Court of 
Appeal resigned in 2007, and others 
followed suit in 2008. In his farewell 
address in January, Justice Roger 
Coventry warned that the judiciary 
had “hemorrhaged,” and urged Fiji 
lawyers to remember that “acquies-
cence is the friend of illegality.” Chief 
Justice of Australia Robert French 
explained that he could not renew 
his appointment to the Fiji Supreme 
Court because to do so would entail 
an “implicit bargain” with the interim 
government, and that “when faced 
with a challenge to the lawfulness of 
the government itself, such a judge 
could be seen to have a confl ict of 
interest” (The Australian, 2 May 
2008). High Court Justice Gerard 
Winter similarly concluded, “I could 
not renew my warrant in 2008 if the 
military regime was still in power as 
to do so would run contrary to my 
original oath of offi ce” (The Austra-
lian, 15 Aug 2008). Those judges who 
took up appointments were often 
quite explicit about their support for 
the military-transfi gured judicial order. 
Victorian barrister Jocelynne Scutt, the 
former Tasmanian antidiscrimination 
commissioner, was widely criticized 
in Australia after accepting a position 
on Fiji’s High Court (The Australian, 
14 March, 22 Aug 2008). Thomas 
Hickie took an appointment in March, 
and thereafter regularly lambasted the 
media for refusing to acknowledge the 
independence of the judiciary. 
During 2008, the International 
Bar Association was twice prevented 
from entering Fiji, fi rst in February 
and then again in December. Over the 
course of the year, lawyers associated 
with critics of the regime were, at one 
point, called into court to be berated 
by an angry judge and, in another 
case, barred from entering Fiji. Judges 
indicated their preparedness to sit on 
appeals against their own judgments, 
where normal protocol would have 
suggested that they step aside. In the 
wake of the High Court decision in 
Qarase v Bainimarama, Fiji’s attorney 
general threatened those criticizing the 
judgment with “contempt of court” 
proceedings. When both the Fiji Times 
and the Daily Post published a let-
ter challenging the decision of Gates, 
Byrne, and Pathik, the government 
took legal action. That both news-
papers pleaded guilty was indicative 
of the media’s increasing submission 
under the new order. Fiji Sun publisher 
Russell Hunter had been deported 
in February and Fiji Times publisher 
Evan Hannah was deported in May, 
both whisked out of the country at 
speed to avoid enforcement of court 
orders. The once staunchly pro-sdl 
Daily Post was, by the end of the 
year, reduced to dutifully publish-
ing pro–interim government propa-
ganda. Nevertheless, some courageous 
local intellectuals—including lawyer 
Graham Leung, economics professor 
Wadan Narsey, and former Vice Presi-
dent Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi—contin-
ued to openly criticize the regime and 
their comments were widely reported 
in the press. 
A critical step in the effort to con-
solidate a new legal order had been the 
forced removal of Chief Justice Daniel 
Fatiaki, who had been confronted by 
soldiers with the option of resigning 
or going “on leave” in January 2007. 
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In early 2008, charges were fi nally 
laid against Justice Fatiaki, includ-
ing falsifying tax returns, “failure to 
uphold the dignity and high stand-
ing of the offi ce,” and complicity in 
assisting the Offi ce of the President in 
drafting illegal decrees in the wake of 
the 19 May 2000 coup. In December, 
however, the attorney general reported 
having reached a settlement with the 
deposed chief justice: in return for a 
formal resignation and the dropping 
of proceedings relating to his removal 
from offi ce, Fatiaki was to receive 
f$275,000 and to be allowed to draw 
his pension and other benefi ts as a 
retired judge (Fiji Government 2008b). 
In return, the interim government 
agreed to drop all charges against the 
former head of the judiciary, suggest-
ing that the anticorruption rhetoric of 
the cleanup campaign was less impor-
tant than capturing the key levers of 
judicial power. Acting Chief Justice 
Anthony Gates was formally sworn in 
as Chief Justice of Fiji. 
Fiji ended 2008 with little cause for 
optimism. The “interim” government 
had entrenched and isolated itself 
over the course of the year, another 
indication of which was the expul-
sion of acting New Zealand High 
Commissioner Caroline McDonald 
on Christmas Eve in retaliation for 
Wellington’s travel bans. It had been a 
year fi lled with propaganda emanating 
from the National Council for Build-
ing a Better Fiji and the gcc Review 
Team, but there was little sign of any 
groundswell of support for the interim 
government’s initiatives. The idealism 
of the cleanup campaign, which had 
been the original justifi cation for the 
December 2006 coup, had been tar-
nished by serious allegations against 
the fi nance minister and, indeed, the 
commander himself (whose receipt of 
f$185,000 in back pay for leave not 
taken since 1978 was under investiga-
tion by the auditor general). Instead, 
the multiracialist objectives of the 
People’s Charter had acquired primary 
signifi cance in the quest for popular 
legitimacy, but here too the emphasis 
on the necessity for electoral reform 
looked increasingly like a delaying 
tactic. The dissolution of Fiji’s munici-
pal councils in December suggested 
that, far from heading back toward 
constitutional democracy, the interim 
government was busy dismantling yet 
a further tier of elected government. 
The worsening economic situation 
inter nationally, coupled with Fiji’s 
homemade and coup-driven slow-
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New Caledonia is gaining more 
control over its own affairs, due to 
negotiated accords that promised it 
economic “rebalancing” and evolv-
ing autonomy. Paris has continued to 
delegate more powers of self-govern-
ment to the country, and 2008 was a 
year to refl ect on the anniversaries of 
the peacemaking Matignon-Oudinot 
Accords of 1988 and the Noumea 
Accord of 1998 (the latter of which 
has come to constitute a sort of 
interim constitution). Kanak cultural 
identity made further advances in local 
institutions, as did symbols associated 
with the agreed pursuit of a “common 
destiny.” But politics in this small, 
multiethnic society of only a quarter 
million people continued to be con-
tentious and complex, as seen in the 
municipal elections in March, ongoing 
party splintering, and the approach 
of provincial elections in May 2009, 
which will elect a Congress empow-
ered to discuss an independence 
referendum. Despite a sharp drop in 
nickel prices over the year because of 
the world economic slump, mining 
expansion continued, though the Goro 
metal processing plant project in the 
South remained controversial. Labor 
unions were active, but more aggres-
sive police interventions limited their 
strike actions. France still provided 
massive fi nancial aid to the territory—
more than us$2 billion annually—and 
planned further France-Pacifi c sum-
mits, while also using New Caledo-
nia’s new associate membership in the 
Pacifi c Islands Forum to help spread 
French infl uence in the region.
Since 2004, ad hoc cooperation has 
grown between the centrist loyalists of 
Avenir Ensemble (ae, Future Together) 
and the pro-independence parties. 
Both groups support government 
intervention in social and economic 
planning more than the conserva-
tives, who criticized the new trend as 
“socialism” or “state capitalism.” But 
ae leader Philippe Gomès, president 
of the populous Southern Province, 
called it “economic will” to master 
strategic resources and labeled the 
conservative free trade vision “Ameri-
can style ultra-liberalism” (NC, 26 Sept 
2008). Because of the infl ated cost of 
living (food prices are twice as high 
as in France and local housing costs 
equal those of Paris), the ae-led Con-
gress imposed price and rent controls 
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last year, and this year its formula 
limited rent increases by half, while 
it continued to build more affordable 
lodging with French aid (NC, 18 Jan, 
5 July 2008). Congress has lowered 
income taxes on the middle class as 
well as inheritance taxes; has pur-
chased majority ownership of Enercal 
(New Caledonia’s primary power pro-
ducer and supplier); and has actively 
negotiated the transfer of responsibil-
ity for secondary education—which 
France took over in 1967—back to 
New Caledonia. It is working on plans 
to coordinate economic development 
among the three provinces and to 
regulate the mining industry, rather 
than leave the latter to the “anarchic 
and quasi-wild” style of the past (NC, 
13 Aug 2008). The South has started 
economic activity zones in cooperation 
with indigenous customary leaders to 
provide jobs in tribal reserves, and its 
vast Gouaro Deva ecotourism project 
near Bourail has combined provincial, 
private, and customary input in a plan 
to develop 24,000 acres by the sea 
(NC, 8 Aug 2008). By June 2008, the 
centrists were proposing to territorial-
ize ownership of the Société le Nickel 
(sln), the country’s largest mining 
company and employer.
From April through June various 
commemorations of the peace accords 
were held, including ceremonies on 
Ouvea to mourn the violence that 
had taken place there in 1988. That 
tragedy was portrayed in a fi lm by 
Mehdi Lallaoui, which was broadcast 
on television. In an interview,  former 
Premier Bernard Pons called the 
Ouvea hostage crisis and the deaths of 
twenty-fi ve people “one of the saddest 
moments of my life.” Yet he defended 
actions taken by French troops against 
the Kanak militants who had killed 
four gendarmes and taken hostages 
to protest against Pons’s proposed 
regressive statute for New Caledonia 
(which would have reduced the pow-
ers of Kanak-ruled provinces instead 
of promoting self-rule). Pierre Frogier 
of the loyalist Rassemblement pour la 
Calédonie dans la République (rpcr) 
objected to what he saw as bias in the 
made-for-television fi lm and published 
a letter to “young people” in the terri-
tory in which he blamed the Front de 
Libération Nationale Kanak et Social-
iste (flnks) for the violence. He also 
argued that there were victims in both 
camps during the 1980s “events,” 
not only in Hienghene (where eleven 
Kanak were ambushed in 1984) and 
Ouvea (where nineteen Kanak were 
killed). He said that the famous hand-
shake between loyalist Jacques Lafl eur 
and Kanak independence leader Jean-
Marie Tjibaou in 1988 constituted 
a moment that young people should 
emulate by reaching out to each other 
“without forgetting anything in this 
past” (NC, 17 May 2008). Colloquia 
refl ecting on the two anniversaries 
were held in Paris and Noumea and 
were attended by scholars and par-
ticipants in both accords, on 26 June, 
the date the 1988 Matignon Accord 
was reached. Former Premier Michel 
Rocard, who had successfully brought 
Tjibaou and Lafl eur together to 
negotiate, spoke in Paris and Noumea 
about his refl ections, even suggesting 
that in the post–cold war world of 
increasing globalization and regional-
ism, now-autonomous New Caledo-
nia “is already independent.” “The 
concept no longer has meaning,” he 
opined, since France has ceded some 
of its once-sovereign powers to the 
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European Union (NC, 27 May 2008). 
Yet French voters rejected the pro-
posed EU constitution in 2005, and 
many have agitated against further 
immigration. France also retains UN 
Security Council veto power and has 
its own nuclear weapons, hinting that 
it regards the concept of independence 
as meaningful.
Two rival visions of plausible 
outcomes for New Caledonia’s “com-
mon destiny”—the goal set out in the 
Noumea Accord in 1998 and written 
into the French constitution the fol-
lowing year—have emerged in recent 
discourses as a possible referendum 
on independence approaches in 2014. 
Metropolitan French and local loyal-
ists often speak of federalism, since 
New Caledonia’s three provinces each 
have a signifi cant degree of autonomy 
and the territory itself (as an “over-
seas collectivity”) is gaining increasing 
autonomy from France. Legal scholar 
Jean-Yves Faberon views this “double 
federalism” (internal and external) 
as a “guarantee against intolerances” 
because each province can develop 
in its own way, while France remains 
an “impartial arbiter” between the 
immigrant and indigenous groups. He 
presented his analysis at the Paris col-
loquium on the accords organized by 
Jean-Marc Regnault (TPM, June 2008). 
The current French high commissioner 
(Yves Dassonville), the former premier 
(Rocard), and loyalist political lead-
ers also tout this federal arrangement, 
sometimes pointing to the troubles in 
neighboring anglophone Melanesian 
countries, and the interdependence 
created by globalization, as sound 
reasons to drop the “outdated” idea 
of independence. Frogier even pro-
posed holding the referendum in 2014 
to “purge” the independence ques-
tion and ensure that New Caledonia 
remains “in” France. Territorial Presi-
dent Harold Martin proposed instead 
a consensual negotiation before 2014 
to remove “doubt” about the future 
(NC, 5 Jan, 6 June 2008).
Ever since Edgar Pisani’s futile 
proposal of independence-in-associa-
tion in 1985, which Tjibaou regarded 
as a real “opening” in constructive 
dialogue, the trend among some inde-
pendence supporters has been to speak 
of “sovereignty in association with 
France” as a possible compromise, but 
usually as a step toward full indepen-
dence. In June, Victor Tutugoro of the 
flnks said he did not mind Rocard’s 
blithe comments about the obsoles-
cence of independence, admitting (as 
Tjibaou had twenty years earlier) that 
countries are not completely inde-
pendent today, but that, nevertheless, 
sovereignty “is the ability to choose 
one’s own interdependencies.” He 
said, “The demand for independence 
stops on the day it succeeds,” imply-
ing a maximalist approach, and he 
added that the flnks was prepared to 
go to the United Nations, the Melane-
sian Spearhead, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement for support, as it had done 
in 1986 to lobby for New Caledonia 
to be put back on the UN decoloni-
zation list (NC, 17 June 2008). Paul 
Neaoutyine, president of the North, 
has said, “independence is not nego-
tiable, it’s a right like breathing,” and 
those who claim that globalization 
has negated it are engaging in “sub-
terfuge” (Neaoutyine 2006, 94). In 
response to grandiose statements at 
the Paris colloquium that New Cale-
donia had already reached a state of 
independence (except for the powers 
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reserved for France, namely military, 
public order, the courts, money, and 
foreign affairs), Neaoutyine suggested 
that the speakers needed to decolonize 
their minds (Le Goff 2008). Even Sen-
ator Simon Loueckhote, formerly of 
the rpcr, has formed his own party, 
Le Mouvement de la Diversité (lmd), 
and is studying Pacifi c cases of “free 
association,” the arrangement pro-
posed by the United Nations in 1960 
as one way to end unequal colonial 
status (NC, 9 June 2008). In a sense, 
the distinction between federalism in 
France and association with France 
depends on what perspective the 
speaker is looking from—Europe (at 
least mentally, in the case of loyalists) 
or the Pacifi c. The former privileges 
the metropole while the latter centers 
the country in Oceania. 
In March 2008, local municipal 
elections mobilized political rhetoric 
again, as a kind of rehearsal for the 
provincial elections in 2009. Over 
two thousand candidates competed 
in thirty-three communes. The flnks 
tried to run on a single list supporting 
the transfer of self-governing measures 
from France, though in many com-
munes local alliances often cross the 
lines of territorial parties, and some-
times rival flnks members like Parti 
de Libération Kanak (Palika) and the 
Union Calédonienne (uc) compete. 
In the multiethnic capital, Noumea, 
where most of the country’s popula-
tion and economic activity is concen-
trated, the flnks joined a list with 
progressives, since Kanak residents 
tend to vote in their home districts in 
the North or Islands. Neaoutyine of 
Palika emphasized the transfer of pow-
ers and the progress of the Koniambo 
project in building greater economic 
balance in the country, both of which, 
he said, were important to “us who 
want to become independent” (NC, 18 
Feb 2008). Among loyalist parties, the 
ae and rpcr competed mainly in the 
South, and the ae backed Jean-Pierre 
Aifa’s campaign to regain Bourail 
on a platform of local development. 
Seven lists competed in Noumea, 
including the new Labor Party cre-
ated by the pro-independence Union 
Syndicaliste des Travailleurs Kanak et 
Exploités (ustke), whose separatism 
was lamented by the flnks, much 
as Loueckhote took away votes from 
the rpcr. In the runoff for mayor, 
Loueckhote and Sonia Lagarde of 
the ae could not agree to ally against 
the incumbent, with the result that 
Jean Lèques of the rpcr won a fi fth 
term. Aifa won in Bourail, but the 
ae lost Dumbea to the rpcr (pir, 18 
March 2008). In the North, Neaou-
tyine won a close race in Poindimié 
after a spouse-abuse conviction, but 
Martin easily won again in Paita in 
the South. Overall, a relative equi-
librium endured, as the ae and rpcr 
each controlled six communes, though 
Noumea dwarfed the others in size. 
Pro-independence lists won the rest, 
except for some mixed council majori-
ties, and fi ve women (three pro-inde-
pendence and two loyalist) became 
mayors (NC, 18 March 2008). 
The other political spectacle of 
the year was growing dissension in 
the loyalist parties, most notably in 
the ae, whose Gaullist members had 
been courted by the rpcr ever since 
the latter won both the deputy seats 
(again) in the 2007 legislative elections 
to the French National Assembly. In 
addition, the rpcr won 40 percent of 
the votes in the South in the com-
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munal elections and Frogier retains 
the presidency of Congress. This 
has prompted Frogier to assert that 
the rpcr is the premier party in the 
country, although in reality it has only 
a fourth of the total seats in Congress. 
The “government,” or territorial 
executive chosen by Congress, has its 
own president, Martin of the ae. Mar-
tin, however, belongs to the rpcr’s 
metropolitan Gaullist ally, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union 
pour un Mouvement Populaire (ump), 
whereas several other ae leaders, such 
as Didier Leroux, belong to former 
French President Giscard d’Estaing’s 
party, the Union pour la Démocratie 
Français (udf). Yet Martin continued 
to uphold the ae’s social democratic 
policies, in spite of Frogier’s call for 
more “deregulation” of the economy 
and a less “socialist” reading of the 
Noumea Accord (French Socialist 
premiers had negotiated both peace 
accords). Martin ridiculed the quest 
for “national” symbols in New 
Caledonia, and criticized the transfer 
of control over secondary education 
to the territory, despite ump Premier 
François Fillon’s affi rmation that such 
transfers of responsibility are “the real 
motor of the Noumea Accord.” Pierre 
Bretegnier of the rpcr also attacked 
interventions in the economy by the 
provincial governments as “socialist” 
(NC, 7 Jan, 29 March, 12 Sept 2008). 
Tension grew in 2008 between two 
factions of the ae, that of Martin and 
Leroux, and that of Gomès. Gomès 
accused Martin-Leroux of moving 
too close to the rpcr, while they in 
turn accused him of cooperating too 
much with the flnks. The political 
“center” thus appeared to be torn 
between the country’s two rival poles, 
though in reality neither polemical 
representation was entirely accurate, 
and at least part of the confl ict was 
over personalities. In January, Chris-
tine  Gambey of Libération Kanak 
Socialiste (lks)—who was elected in 
the South on the ae list in 2004, and 
in 2007 used a blank ballot tactic to 
enable the flnks to gain an extra 
seat in the government executive (via 
proportional representation)—was 
abruptly fi red from the South’s 
tourism authority. She called it an 
“ambush” and blamed Gomès, the 
president of the South, while Leroux 
and others defended her (NC, 30 Jan 
2008). She said the good of the coun-
try was more important than egos, 
and that the true ae was “an up-to-
date, contemporary, multiethnic party, 
in the spirit of our common destiny, a 
party that promotes tolerance,” unlike 
the rpcr (NC, 18 July 2008). In June, 
each ae faction held a separate party 
congress. Although 12 out of 16 ae 
delegates in Congress stood by Gomès, 
Leroux was elected head of the Martin 
faction. By then, the local branch of 
the right-wing Front National (fn, the 
party of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, 
which is virulently anti-immigrant) 
had also divided into two factions, 
one of which formed a new party that 
aimed to gather dissidents from other 
parties into a new coalition (NC, 20 
June, 21 June 2008).
Amid this loyalist splintering, the 
ae schism got nastier, as Gomès’s 
group was refused offi cial permission 
by Congress President Frogier to sit 
as a new party and thus lost access 
to posts in the congressional commis-
sions, to the advantage of the flnks. 
Gomès’s ae also lost its appeals in 
the administrative court, but it fi nally 
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formed a new party regardless, Calé-
donie Ensemble (Caledonia Together, 
ce), and maneuvered for more access 
to posts (NC, 8 Sept, 13 Oct 2008). 
Situated between the rpcr (13 seats) 
and the flnks/lks (18 seats), 23 
seats were now held by seven splinter 
groups, including Loueckhote’s lmd 
(NC, 22 July 2008). The Noumea 
newspaper said such diversity could be 
a sign of either a healthy democracy 
or a cancer in the loyalist camp (NC, 
3 July 2008). Gomès claimed his new 
party would “carry the real country,” 
as opposed to the Martin-Leroux ae 
rump, which had “defi nitively rejoined 
the rpcr.” He sought to build “a 
little nation within the French nation” 
on constructive dialogue, increasing 
self-government and socioeconomic 
progress (NC, 13 Oct 2008). Leroux, 
who belongs to the metropolitan udf, 
not Sarkozy’s Gaullist rump, said that 
his ae was still the same party that 
had won power in the 2004 provincial 
elections: “The rpcr wants Caledonia 
in France, but without the others or 
above the others. The independentists 
want very much the others but with-
out France. We want both, because 
radicalization is a mortal danger” 
(NC, 9 Oct 2008). While the rpcr and 
flnks both want a referendum on 
independence in 2014 (but for oppo-
site reasons), both ae groups oppose 
it and instead support dialogue to 
reach a consensus before then to avoid 
another 1980s-style violent confl ict 
(NC, 10 Oct 2008). 
Meanwhile, in the 2009 provincial 
elections, the flnks have vowed to 
repeat the unity shown in the 2007 
French legislative elections, when 
Charles Pidjot of the uc won 45 per-
cent of the ballots in the second dis-
trict (mostly in the North and Islands 
provinces). The Congress elected in 
May 2009 will be chosen by a more 
restricted electorate of long-term 
residents. The flnks hopes to sweep 
the North and Islands, and for the 
fi rst time also win seats in the South, 
and through allying with progressives 
gain a majority (NC, 22 Sept 2008; La 
Voie du FLNKS Sept–Oct 2008). Frogier 
deployed a boxing analogy when he 
argued that the ae had never been a 
real party and had engaged in waste-
ful government interventions in the 
economy: “I knocked to the mat the 
president of Congress [then Martin] 
and the president of the Government 
[then Mrs Marie-Noelle Thémereau]. 
Gaël Yanno [of the rpcr] sent to the 
ropes the president of the Southern 
Province [still Gomès].” Accused by 
other parties of using his position as 
Congress president to stall the passage 
of reform laws, Frogier says his goal 
is to restore the rpcr to power, which 
it had held for almost twenty years 
before 2004, “because we must exit 
quickly from the logic of independen-
tists against non-independentists, and 
purge the question of independence to 
build a society composed of a diverse 
human community. . . . Caledonian 
society will be more and more mixed 
[métissée]” (NC,16 Oct 2008). Diverse 
perhaps, but assimilated? At the 
rpcr convention, Frogier had talked 
dismissively of the Noumea Accord, 
with its transfer of responsibilities and 
proposed Kanak “national” symbols, 
and accused the flnks of failing in its 
administration of the North because 
of divided leadership and in its duty to 
seek pardon for loyalist Melanesians 
who were persecuted in the 1980s (NC, 
5 Oct 2008). Victor Tutugoro of the 
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flnks argued that the Kanak uprising 
at that time was against a dominant 
system that had negated Kanak iden-
tity, even though the Kanak people 
repeatedly invited non-Kanak to join 
them in building a country (NC, 9 Oct 
2008). The lks reiterated that inclu-
sive, “Oceanian” view in the Islands 
Province: “The right of indigenous 
peoples does not exclude others”; they 
also noted that the rpcr itself had 
experienced dissensions (NC, 23 Oct 
2008).
In October, pre-provincial election 
party conventions raised the tone of 
political rhetoric. The ae of Martin-
Leroux, which Gomès accused of 
being too close to the rpcr, instead 
took offense at Frogier’s attacks 
on the ae in October and defended 
its reformist, state-guided develop-
ment record. “The rpcr has not 
changed. . . . the reasons why we 
created the ae in 2004 still exist,” 
Leroux noted. “We are now the only 
credible rampart against the return 
of the rpcr, against the return of a 
partisan movement whose aggressive-
ness divides New Caledonia into two 
blocs. We don’t have the right to allow 
the social advances allowed by the ae 
to be called into question” (NC, 20 Oct 
2008). Gomès proposed helping the 
middle class with zero interest rates 
on home purchases and touted the 
success of his development programs 
in the South. Martin followed suit at 
the territorial level, offering afford-
able housing and progress in choosing 
local identity symbols (NC, 29 Oct, 3 
Nov 2008). The flnks bid for unity, 
however, was threatened by the ongo-
ing rivalry between Palika (which 
has dominated the coalition in recent 
years, especially in the North) and the 
uc (the oldest political party in New 
Caledonia and the former leader of 
the flnks under Tjibaou). The uc 
saw the world fi nancial crisis as an 
opportunity to gain local control over 
the mining industry, since France was 
retrenching its budget, and to make 
local citizenship a reality, to protect 
employment preferences. Pidjot even 
dismissed the annual accord signers 
committee meeting (though other uc 
leaders went in his place, including 
former uc President Rock Wamytan), 
to protest what he saw as the changed 
role of the French State from arbiter 
to pro-loyalist actor while allowing 
Kanak and Wallisians to continue their 
intercommunal struggle at the bottom 
of the economy. Too many meetings 
and words, he complained, and not 
enough action on implementing the 
Noumea Accord’s lingering prom-
ises. In addition, increased economic 
diversifi cation along with more open 
discussion within the flnks would 
give greater voice to the frustrated uc 
constituency, because Palika com-
pletely excludes it from power in the 
North, where uc-backed clans stage 
customary protests against environ-
mental and other abuses by provincial 
mining projects (NC, 3 Nov, 1 Dec, 
4 Dec 2008). Like the uc, however, 
Palika reiterated its demand for inde-
pendence, and the continued transfer 
of responsibilities from Paris to the 
local government. It also cited the 
progress made in the Koniambo proj-
ect and the Korean processing plant, 
and advocated a unifi ed electoral cam-
paign in 2009, especially in the South 
(NC, 7 Nov 2008; kol 21 Nov 2008), 
although the smaller parties in the 
flnks seemed to want territorial party 
unity more (NC, 1 Dec 2008).
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The annual meeting of the signers 
of the Noumea Accord in Paris added 
more fuel to the verbal fi re, though 
all sides nevertheless took heart from 
Sarkozy’s pledge of French support for 
the successful completion of the con-
tinuing devolution of powers to the 
territory, as promised in the accord. 
Some loyalists had already been disap-
pointed by reductions in French mili-
tary presence overseas and a budget-
ary reform that reduces the payment 
of retirement pensions at “indexed” 
rates (almost twice the metropolitan 
level) for those who move overseas, 
even if they had never resided in New 
Caledonia before retirement (NC, 11 
Nov 2008). In late November, Sarkozy 
told a delegation of New Caledonian 
mayors that France would respect 
both the letter and the spirit of the 
Noumea Accord, helping to “create 
the conditions in which the popula-
tion will be able to freely choose its 
destiny.” “Everyone has the right to 
defend his convictions,” he said, “and 
whatever they are, all Caledonians are 
faced with the same challenge: lasting 
success at living together in the same 
land.” He outlined fi ve goals for the 
French overseas territories: increase 
competitiveness, build accordable 
housing, improve external transpor-
tation links, create a professional 
workforce, and preserve nature while 
promoting durable growth (NC, 29 
Nov 2008). Two weeks later, Sarkozy 
repeated his attachment to the accord, 
recognizing the legitimacy in New 
Caledonia of both the indigenous 
Kanak and immigrant communities in 
their dual quest for a common des-
tiny. He said that promised transfers 
of responsibility would continue, as 
would dialogue between labor unions 
and employers (as long as public order 
was respected); protection of cultural 
and biological diversity; promotion of 
education to overcome social imbal-
ances; and mining projects, which are 
“strategic for our country”—an echo 
of Gaullist thinking in the 1960s. In 
their responses, Neaoutyine, Frogier, 
Martin, and Gomès expressed positive 
sentiments about Sarkozy’s sincer-
ity but spun his speech to their own 
liking. “We must accept our past,” 
said Neaoutyine, president of the 
North, “because we are in a process 
of decolonization and emancipation.” 
Frogier applauded “the return of the 
State’s authority” as an actor, though 
he later complained that not much of 
substance was said except for assur-
ances that secondary education would 
maintain its quality (NC, 10 Dec, 17 
Dec 2008). Martin emphasized the 
need for consensual decision making, 
predicting that even the 2009 pro-
vincial elections would not produce 
a ruling majority in Congress (NC, 17 
Dec 2008). Palika and the uc resumed 
sniping at each other afterwards, but 
Gambey organized an association to 
pursue funding for youth (NC, 15 Dec 
2008). The Labor Party supported 
independence, with the Kanaky fl ag as 
the new national emblem. Its radical 
anti-colonial stance was applauded by 
allies from France such as the Greens, 
Trotskyists, Corsicans, and Larzac 
peasant leader José Bové, who said 
the world crisis of free market capital-
ism was an opportunity to refl ect on 
systemic economic change (NC, 17–18 
Nov 2008). 
Meanwhile, the Société Minière du 
Sud Pacifi que (smsp, or South Pacifi c 
Mining Company), which is owned 
by the Northern Province, has a 
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us$4 billion processing plant project 
underway at Koniambo, of which it 
commands 51 percent of the shares 
in partnership with Swiss Xstrata. 
Also, the smsp has just opened an ore 
processing plant in South Korea, of 
which it owns 51 percent of the shares 
in partnership with Posco. The com-
pany even offered to help the territory 
to purchase the sln, which might 
be accomplished by trading locally 
owned shares of the sln’s parent com-
pany, Eramet (NC, 28 June, 30 June 
2008). The smsp was preparing the 
site for its Koniambo plant and nearby 
seaport and housing developments, 
with the help of tax breaks and fi nan-
cial aid from France (us$260 million), 
revenues from selling ore to Posco in 
South Korea, and various bank loans 
(NC, 1 March 2008). The North also 
established an environmental protec-
tion policy, but has been impeded on 
several fronts: local fi rms protested 
against the hiring of transporters 
from the South, interclan disputes 
raged over land claims (NC, 16 May 
2008), and the territorial government 
refused to allow nineteen Filipino 
“specialists” (cheaper than locals) to 
work on the site (NC, 20 Aug 2008). 
To make matters worse, the global 
fi nancial crisis reduced the price of 
nickel to us$13,450 a ton in October 
(NC, 16 Oct 2008; pir, 23 Oct 2008), 
Koniambo investor Lehman Brothers 
failed and a Chinese bank pulled out 
of the project, as did the construction 
fi rm that had hired the Filipinos. But 
a Swiss bank soon replaced Lehman, 
and the opening of the Posco pro-
cessing plant in Korea improved the 
smsp’s credibility in Asia (NC, 24 Oct 
2008). Xstrata has assured the prov-
ince that if necessary it will fi nance the 
Koniambo project on its own, using 
dividends temporarily withheld from 
the province, but the risks of multina-
tional mining deals became ever more 
apparent (NC, 3 Dec 2008). 
In the South, now that unesco is 
protecting the lagoon, construction of 
the us$3.2 billion, twice-halted Goro 
nickel processing plant was proceed-
ing, despite the lingering environmen-
tal issue of how to dispose of its toxic 
waste. Separating increasingly limited 
amounts of ore from massive amounts 
of excavated soil requires poisonous 
chemicals. The Goro project direc-
tor for inco of Canada (now in fact 
owned by the Brazilian fi rm Vale) has 
insisted that the waste is too expen-
sive to evaporate, because the humid 
climate is too moist to dry it naturally, 
and the electrical heaters needed to do 
it would require too much power and 
create too much air pollution! (NC, 
26 March 2008). The plan, contested 
in protests and in the courts, was to 
lay a twenty-one-kilometer heavy 
plastic pipe, perforated only in the last 
link, from the plant out to the Havan-
nah Channel in the interim between 
the whale and cyclone seasons of 2008 
to allow production to start in 2009 
(NC, 25 Oct 2008). In response, Gomès 
imposed an extra tax on the pipe of 
1 percent of Goro’s total business, 
and he proposed raising the country’s 
share of royalties from 10 percent to 
20 percent (NC, 16 Feb 2008). As for 
Raphael Mapou’s association, Rhéébù 
Nùù, which had battled inco for six 
years over environmental, economic, 
and customary land issues, it won 
the municipal election in nearby Yaté 
and erected a Kanak totem pole on a 
hill above the Goro site to symbolize 
continuing vigilance (NC, 15 March, 
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14 July 2008). In September, Rhéébù 
Nùù signed a “pact for durable devel-
opment” with Goro Nickel, in which 
it promised to abide by law and order 
in return for the creation of a founda-
tion to fi nance local economic and 
educational enterprises, a consultative 
customary environmental oversight 
committee, and a funded reforesta-
tion project. The association claimed, 
“We have verifi ed that there would 
be no irreversible pollution,” much to 
the dismay of ecologists and political 
sympathizers (NC, 27–29 Sept 2008; 
kol 7 Oct 2008). Meanwhile, inco’s 
permit for the nearby Prony West site 
(granted almost for free by the former 
Southern Province regime of Jacques 
Lafl eur) was defi nitively revoked on 
appeal in June, after a long legal strug-
gle. Gomès awarded the permit to the 
sln, despite its prediction of reduced 
nickel production in 2009 due to the 
global economic slump. Gomès had 
negotiated the possibility of increasing 
royalties on Goro to 20 percent, and 
if the sln builds a processing plant 
at Prony, the country will own 25 
percent of the shares, in line with his 
goal of increasing local control (NC, 16 
June, 26 Sept, 4 Dec 2008). 
In the most industrialized country 
in Oceania, labor unions remain a 
powerful force in creating pressure 
for progress (eg, favoring local hiring, 
a key component of creating a local 
citizenship). Unfortunately, they also 
disrupt many people’s lives, as with 
blockades of ports and roads for 
few tangible gains. Dramatic union 
action has often served as a means to 
attract followers to the leading labor 
organizations, but High Commis-
sioner Yves Dassonville (like his boss 
Sarkozy in France) has been severe 
with militant strikers. The Union 
Syndicaliste des Ouvriers et Employés 
de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (usoenc) 
retained its number one ranking in the 
May union elections with over 5,000 
supporters, as a result of its detailed 
platform for combating the high cost 
of living and its preference for “social 
dialogue” (NC, 5 May 2008). Sylvain 
Nea’s maverick Conféderation Syndi-
cale des Travailleurs de la Nouvelle-
Calédonie (cstnc), often accused of 
being allied with the rpcr against the 
ae regime, mobilized long, disruptive 
strikes in 2005 and 2006, but was 
more subdued this year after several 
court convictions (NC, 30 Aug 2008). 
The ustke, which came in second in 
the labor union rankings, battled riot 
police and tear gas and threatened the 
life of a bus company boss in January 
(NC, 18 Jan 2008); called a general 
strike to protest against arrests; dem-
onstrated in May despite the use of 
tear gas; and called two more gen-
eral strikes, resulting in twenty court 
convictions, fi nes, and prison time 
for some of its members (NC, 10 Sept 
2008). The ustke-affi liated Labor 
Party won 6,000 votes in fourteen 
communes in March, for a total of 
thirty-three elected city councilors, 
despite flnks complaints of disunity 
(NC, 31 March 2008). In December, a 
proposed “law of the country” was set 
before Congress to grant local citizen-
ship (and thus employment opportuni-
ties) only to ten-year residents, unless 
an employer can prove an individual 
of shorter residence has irreplaceable 
qualifi cations (NC, 10 Dec 2008).
France increased its budgetary 
aid to all its overseas territories to 
more than us$5 billion, earmarked 
especially for social spending and 
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economic development, with 40 
percent of the funds to go to New 
Caledonia (pir, 1 Oct 2008; NC, 1 
Oct 2008). That news was welcome 
as the territory and provinces faced 
budget cuts due to the drop in nickel 
prices. The resource-poor Islands 
Province dipped into its reserves to 
maintain services and wages, but the 
populous South and Noumea actually 
increased their budgets for 2009 to 
continue internal social rebalancing 
and economic expansion. The rpcr 
and Leroux-ae opposed the added 
expenditures, but Gomès’s ce and 
elements of the fn voted to continue 
“durable development” (NC, 13 Dec, 
20 Dec 2008). A moderate budget 
passed in Congress due to support 
from the Leroux- Martin ae, the rpcr, 
the fn, and Loueckhote; Gomès’s 
ce and the lks voted against it, and 
the flnks abstained. Bernard Lepeu 
of the uc said, “The time of skinny 
cows has arrived, but the government 
continues to lower taxes” (NC, 24 Dec 
2008). Fully one-fourth of New Cale-
donians are judged to be in poverty 
(NC, 11 Dec 2008), prompting Didier 
Guenant-Jeanson of the usoenc to 
suggest that it was time to reform the 
retail sector; he said, “We import infl a-
tion,” which is at a record 3.3 percent, 
while agriculture is neglected (NC, 5 
Dec 2008). But in Paris, an expensive 
new House of New Caledonia was 
opened to serve students and others 
from the “Caillou” (literally, rock, 
ie, New Caledonia) in France, and 
to hold cultural events in the name 
of promoting a common destiny and 
identity (NC, 24 Nov 2008). French 
high commissioners and ambassadors 
in the Pacifi c also met in Noumea to 
discuss “regional integration,” and the 
International Organization of French-
Speakers (Francophonie) headed by 
former President Abdou Diouf of 
Senegal sought links with the Pacifi c 
Islands Forum, now that New Caledo-
nia and French Polynesia are associate 
members (pir, 8 Oct, 14 Nov 2008). 
Gaston Tong Sang, president of French 
Polynesia, visited Noumea to try to 
negotiate a project of cooperation. 
However, local nationalists did not 
like his idea of moving in Tahitian 
workers to help with New Caledonia’s 
mining projects, so not much was 
accomplished other than photo oppor-
tunities with Martin and Frogier (NC, 
21–23 Oct 2008). 
France clearly desires peace in New 
Caledonia and wants to change its 
own image in the region from what it 
was in the 1980s when nuclear testing 
in French Polynesia and the sup-
pression of the Kanak independence 
movement drew antagonism across the 
Pacifi c. Sarkozy is reducing the size of 
the French military, including its pres-
ence in New Caledonia, and reforming 
the costly indexation of civil servant 
pensions, which has allowed retirees 
to move to the Pacifi c territories and 
receive almost double their money, 
thus contributing to local infl ation 
(NC, 26 May, 17 Sept 2008). Now that 
unesco has declared them a World 
Heritage site, France has also vowed 
to protect New Caledonia’s coral reefs, 
partly because it wants to patrol the 
territory’s (and the French Pacifi c’s) 
large exclusive economic zone (NC, 28 
Jan, 11 Feb 2008). French Overseas 
Minister Yves Jego wants to make 
sure that the transfer of self-governing 
responsibilities from Paris to Noumea 
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(provided for by the Noumea Accord 
and the organic laws of 1999) goes 
smoothly because, he said, “Our 
France is not a race, not a land, not a 
skin color . . . it’s the sharing of a uni-
versal quest for liberty, equality and, 
let’s not forget, of brotherhood. Our 
France, it’s this nation without parallel 
which has known how to enlighten 
the world with its brilliance and to 
gather into its crucible such different 
men and women” (NC, 30 May 2008). 
At the Pacifi c Islands Forum in Niue 
in August, Martin touted the Noumea 
Accord and progress made toward a 
common destiny in New Caledonia 
(NC, 21 Aug 2008). Jego announced 
that the next France-Pacifi c summit 
would be held in Noumea in 2009: 
“To answer globalization is to inte-
grate the overseas territories into their 
regional environment.” The French 
presence was welcomed because of 
“instability” in Fiji and elsewhere, said 
the ambassador to Australia (NC, 30 
Aug 2008). 
In cultural affairs, Kanak identity 
found additional recognition in the 
creation of customary police who will 
replace French gendarmes as state 
agents in tribal dispute cases, thus 
transcribing oral palavers into writ-
ten records (pir, 21 May 2008; NC, 
21 March, 23 Oct, 10 Dec 2008). 
An academy of Kanak languages has 
begun to take shape, as agreed in the 
Noumea Accord, to help promote the 
teaching of indigenous languages in 
schools, especially in the multiethnic 
South where urbanization and lan-
guage loss pose a greater threat than 
in the North and Islands (NC, 25 Feb 
2008). To deal with rising juvenile 
delinquency and urban gangs, a new 
local diploma was created to train 
youth activity organizers (NC, 11 June 
2008), and social policies were being 
developed to address the increasing 
number of squatter camps and home-
lessness in the South, with input from 
the Customary Senate (NC, 7 Aug, 
17 Nov 2008). In December, a 
 Wallisian man was beaten to death 
by Kanak youths in the Place des 
Cocotiers in Noumea, while a trial 
was underway about a fatal shooting 
in 2002 during the confl ict in St Louis 
between Kanak and Wallisians, after 
which some of the latter had to be 
evicted (pir, 8 Dec 2008; NC, 11 Oct 
2008). These events highlight the need 
for attention to the economic under-
class in the South. 
In 2003, President Jacques Chi-
rac visited New Caledonia and, on 
a whim, banned questions about 
ethnicity from the local population 
census that year, despite arguments 
that such data were needed to measure 
economic disparities and rebalanc-
ing. In 2008, an agreement was fi nally 
reached to allow the addition of ethnic 
questions in the 2009 survey (NC, 24 
Jan, 9 Oct 2008). The current popula-
tion is estimated at 245,000. In keep-
ing with the Noumea Accord’s provi-
sion for creating new local identity 
symbols, a hymn and motto —“land of 
words, land of sharing” (with the term 
“words” [in French, paroles] connot-
ing oral discourse and commitment)—
were chosen in public contests, with 
bank note designs awaiting a decision 
on whether to adopt the euro. The 
more contentious new country name 
and fl ag will have to be negotiated by 
a committee (NC, 27 June 2008). Billy 
Wapotro, director of the Protestant 
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Educational Alliance, said in June at 
the ceremonial Mwâ Kâ totem pole in 
Noumea, “Rebalancing among people 
happens through the rebalancing of 
thinking” (NC, 27 June 2008).
david chappell
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Papua New Guinea
The year 2008 began on a high note 
with a state visit by Australian Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd from 6–7 March, 
heralding the dawn of a new era 
between Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and Australia. Almost four years of 
diplomatic friction had begun in 2005 
when Prime Minister Sir Michael 
Somare had to go through three 
security checks and remove his sandals 
at the Brisbane airport for security 
personnel. The Australian government 
refused to apologize for the incident, 
calling it a cultural misunderstanding 
between Papua New Guinea’s “big 
man” culture and Australian norms 
and security procedures. This sparked 
public protests in Port Moresby and 
prompted the PNG Department of 
Foreign Affairs to summon Australian 
Ambassador Michael Potts to explain. 
Diplomatic relations between the 
two countries were further strained in 
2006 when the international fugitive 
Julian Moti was spirited out of Port 
Moresby to Solomon Islands in a clan-
destine operation on a PNG Defence 
Force aircraft. The Australian gov-
ernment retaliated by banning PNG 
politicians from entering Australia. 
Rudd’s trip to the country was the 
fi rst such visit by an Australian prime 
minister in eleven years and was well 
received by Papua New Guinea as a 
rejuvenation of its relations with Aus-
tralia. The visit culminated with the 
two countries signing a forest carbon 
partnership whereby both countries 
agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions caused by deforestation and 
forest degradation. 
Following his meeting with Sir 
Michael, Rudd released the “Port 
Moresby Declaration,” stressing 
Australia’s commitment to a “new era 
of cooperation with island nations of 
the Pacifi c.” The twenty-point declara-
tion outlines Australia’s plans related 
to economic development across the 
Pacifi c, as well as their intentions 
to help Pacifi c Island nations make 
progress toward the United Nation’s 
Millennium Development Goals; to 
pursue the Pacifi c Partnerships for 
Development; to work together with 
other countries to meet the  challenges 
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of climate change; and to achieve 
 better outcomes for health and 
education, among other goals (The 
National, 7 March 2008).
On 16 September, the country 
celebrated a rare accomplishment for 
any of the multiethnic states in the 
region: thirty-three years of political 
independence as a thriving democracy 
comprising multiple ethnic groups 
with over 800 different languages. To 
commemorate the anniversary, the 
Somare government launched the fi rst 
government-owned National Televi-
sion Station on Independence Day, 
signifying a monumental development 
in Papua New Guinea’s broadcasting 
history. 
It was also a signifi cant year for 
Sir Michael, the current and founding 
prime minister, as he celebrated his 
fortieth anniversary in PNG politics 
(1968–2008). This makes him the 
longest-serving prime minister in the 
Commonwealth. As PNG political 
history has been plagued by numer-
ous votes of no confi dence, Somare 
became the fi rst prime minister in 
history to survive a full fi ve-year term 
in offi ce (2002–2007) and seems likely 
to make it through his second (2008–
2012)—despite numerous affi rmations 
that he will retire from politics before 
his term expires. 
However, Somare’s celebrated 
longevity in politics did not come with 
a clean slate. In June 2008 he was 
referred by the PNG Ombudsman 
Commission—a political watchdog 
and institution that he helped cre-
ate—to the public prosecutor for 
alleged misconduct in offi ce. Somare 
was investigated over allegations that 
he failed to fi le his annual returns 
(statements accounting for expendi-
tures of District Support Grants and 
discretionary funds) or fi led them late 
or incomplete on many occasions since 
1992 (rnzi, 8 May 2008; Radio Aus-
tralia, 2 July 2008). In June, the then 
chief ombudsman, Ila Geno, said the 
investigation was “based on section 4 
of the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership, which 
requires leaders to furnish to the 
Ombudsman Commission their annual 
statements every 12 months while in 
offi ce.” This was “the fi rst time since 
the Leadership Code was enacted for a 
PNG Prime Minister to be referred for 
prosecution on misconduct charges” 
(The National, 27 June 2008).
Another blow to Somare’s repu-
tation came in November when an 
Australian newspaper reported that 
in April 2007 he had bought a three-
bedroom apartment with a private 
plunge pool in inner-city Cairns for 
a$395,000, through a deal brokered 
by a Gold Coast lawyer. Two months 
before, his son Arthur bought a 
four-bedroom home with his wife at 
Trinity Beach, just north of Cairns, 
for a$685,000. (One Australian dollar 
was the equivalent of approximately 
us$.93 in 2007.) Arthur Somare 
denied any suggestion of wrongdo-
ing in the purchase of his property, 
explaining that it was to accommodate 
his children studying in Australia. 
The legal counsel for the Ombudsman 
Commission, Vergil Narokobi, said 
that the commission would investi-
gate, but it is quite possible that the 
trans actions were legitimate (The 
National, 7 Nov 2008). 
Meanwhile, Opposition Leader 
Sir Mekere Morauta said that the 
Somares owed it to the people to 
reveal their assets and to explain 
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publicly how they obtained the real 
estate. Sir Mekere, in the same year, 
bought a riverfront mansion at New 
Farm in Brisbane’s inner city under his 
wife Roslyn’s name, for a$3.6 mil-
lion. In another controversial case, it 
was alleged that the prime minister 
did not declare his shareholding in the 
company Pacifi c Registry of Ships Ltd. 
The offi cial registry showed that Sir 
Michael is a shareholder “in trust for 
the Independent State of PNG.” All of 
these allegations have contributed to 
overshadowing Sir Michael’s achieve-
ments in his political career and erod-
ing his symbolic status as the “father 
of the nation.”
The ruling National Alliance Party 
experienced a major setback when it 
lost a number of seats due to elec-
tion petitions fi led after the 2007 
general elections. On 21 February, the 
National Court voided the election 
of Minister for Education Michael 
Laimo, a National Alliance Party can-
didate. Laimo lost his parliamentary 
seat due to irregularities and illegal 
practices committed during the 2007 
elections. Steven Kami, a New Genera-
tion Party candidate, challenged the 
election result on the grounds of gross 
errors, omissions, and illegal practices 
committed by Electoral Commission 
offi cials (The National, 22 Feb 2008). 
The next setback came on 23 April 
2008 when East Sepik Governor 
Peter Wararu Waranaka was unseated 
because of a k50 bribe he had given 
a voter. (The PNG kina was the 
equivalent of us$.38 at the time.) This 
resulted from an election petition fi led 
by contender and runner-up candidate 
Gabriel Dusava. 
Then, on 11 September, former 
Chief Justice and Madang Governor 
Sir Arnold Amet was ousted from 
his seat by an election petition fi led 
by businessman and former politi-
cian Peter Yama. Comments made 
by Prime Minister Somare during the 
2007 election campaign urging voters 
not to vote for polygamists or people 
of shady character led the court to rule 
in favor of Yama, who apparently has 
three wives (The National, 12 Sept 
2008).
In an election petition against 
elected Western Highlands Governor 
Tom Olga, a former prime minister 
and 2007 election contender, Paias 
Wingti, asked the court for a recount, 
alleging errors and omissions commit-
ted by Electoral Commission offi cials 
during the polling and counting of 
votes. Wingti won a recount of all pro-
vincial ballot papers in March 2008, 
turning up gross anomalies and omis-
sions on the part of electoral offi cers, 
which resulted in the court declaring 
the election of Governor Tom Olga 
null and void. In what could have 
been a related incident, the Western 
Highlands provincial headquarters, 
known as Kapal Haus, was completely 
destroyed by fi re on 22 October 2008. 
It was believed that supporters of one 
of the candidates were responsible for 
burning down the building.
On 5 June 2008, the Autonomous 
Region of Bougainville lost its found-
ing president, Joseph Kabui, to a 
suspected heart attack. Kabui played 
an instrumental role at the height of 
the Bougainville crisis and in the peace 
building and reconciliation process. 
To succeed him, James Tanis, a former 
separatist, beat thirteen other con-
tenders to be elected president of the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville 
on 28 December. A new chapter in 
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Bougainville’s history began in April 
when the PNG national government 
and the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (abg) signed a memoran-
dum of understanding on the transfer 
of mining, oil, and gas functions to the 
Bougainville government. 
The rate of economic growth 
accelerated in 2008 to 6.6 percent, 
is expected to reach 7 percent in 
2009, and is likely to remain on 
solid ground, potentially above 5 
percent per annum, for the next few 
years (Independence Magazine 2008, 
7–8). This remarkable growth in the 
economy can be attributed primarily 
to the stable political climate bolstered 
by the Organic Law on the Integrity 
of Political Parties and Candidates 
(olippac) and the government’s recep-
tiveness to foreign investment and 
competition in some key sectors of the 
economy such as mining, construction, 
and telecommunications.
According to the World Bank, in 
the past fi ve years Papua New Guinea 
has seen the longest period of uninter-
rupted growth since independence. 
World Bank’s half yearly assessment 
of East Asian and Pacifi c economies 
indicated the gross domestic product 
rose by around 6 percent in 2007, the 
highest real economic growth rate in 
the past decade. Formal employment 
across most sectors has been growing 
by about 10 percent annually since 
2005. This growth was led by con-
struction, telecommunications, and 
export-oriented agriculture (coffee, 
copra, and palm oil) and mining (The 
National, 2 April 2008). While giving 
high marks to PNG economic per-
formance on most fronts, the World 
Bank stated that despite a comfort-
able macro-fi scal position, signifi cant 
structural and policy challenges limit 
its long-term growth potential. In 
order to stimulate private investment, 
particularly outside the mining sector, 
the critical priority is improving the 
business climate, especially by opening 
more markets to competition.
Mobile connectivity between two of 
the rival telecommunication compa-
nies, the government-owned Telikom 
PNG and the Irish company Digicel, 
dominated the early part of the year, 
including interconnection issues and 
tussles over the rights for the interna-
tional gateway. On 16 April, the gov-
ernment used its numerical strength 
to pass amendments to the Telecom-
munication Act, effectively removing 
the international gateway enjoyed 
by Digicel. Minister for Information 
and Communication Patrick Tam-
mur introduced the amendments to 
make Telikom PNG the only licensed 
general carrier. Opposition leader Sir 
Mekere Morauta said that there was 
no justifi cation for the amendments, 
that they would not benefi t the people 
and would take away private com-
panies’ rights. It would also create a 
monopoly for Telikom PNG. After 
several months of delay and customer 
frustration, interconnection between 
Telikom PNG and Digicel fi nally came 
to fruition on 26 June. 
According to the 2007 Informa-
tion and Communication Technolo-
gies Opportunities Index of the World 
Information Society Report 2007—
published jointly by the International 
Telecommunication Union and the 
UN Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment—Papua New Guinea ranked 
poorly (162 out of 183 countries) on 
an international benchmark report 
on access and use of information and 
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communication technologies (ict), 
including mobile telephony, fi xed 
landline phones, and Internet (The 
National, 2 April 2008). The PNG 
government will need to allow more 
competition in the telecommunication 
industry and relax its stringent ict 
policy to reverse the country’s ranking. 
There were also a number of 
signifi cant developments in the min-
ing industry. In early February, the 
Emperor Mines offi cially handed over 
the Tolukuma Gold Mine to the PNG 
company Petromin Holdings Ltd, in a 
ceremony held at the mine site. It was 
the fi rst time in history that a state 
company bought 100 percent of a 
gold-producing mining concern (The 
National, 22 Feb 2008).
One of the biggest and most 
promising projects in PNG mining 
industry got a head start in 2008. The 
liquefi ed natural gas (lng) project will 
become the biggest mineral resource 
extraction seen since independence 
and the third largest such development 
project in the world. In October the 
PNG Parliament passed nine amend-
ments to the Oil and Gas Act that 
will, among other things, provide tax 
concessions during construction of the 
us$10 billion project. Under Exxon-
Mobil, it is projected to produce 6.3 
million tonnes per annum of liquefi ed 
natural gas. With Asia likely to be 
the main market, the fi rst lng sales 
are expected to occur in late 2013 or 
early 2014. The project development 
comprises the upstream infrastructure 
including production wells, processing 
facilities, and a network of pipelines 
linking the wells to the facilities and 
to the main export gas pipeline. Other 
developments include the gas pipeline 
from the highlands to the lng plant 
location just outside of Port Moresby, 
the lng facility itself, export loading, 
and other support facilities located 
near Port Moresby (The National, 2 
April 2008).
The PNG government created 
greater certainty in the lng scheme 
after concluding the fi nancing agree-
ment for a$1.68 billion to fully 
fi nance its 19.4 percent equity in the 
massive project. (The Australian dollar 
had fallen to approximately us$.65 
by November 2008.) The fi nalization 
of the transaction will see the Interna-
tional Petroleum Investment Corpora-
tion (ipic), wholly owned by the Abu 
Dhabi government in the United Arab 
Emirates, acquire exchangeable bonds 
over the PNG government’s 17.6 
percent shareholding in Oil Search. 
This would enable the state to receive 
principal fi nancing from ipic, which 
would be placed in an escrow account 
that could only be drawn down for 
specifi ed purposes related to the proj-
ect (The National, 26 Nov 2008).
In a bid to control the state’s equity, 
the PNG resource company Petromin 
Holdings took court action to take 
control of the state’s Oil Search shares 
given to the Independent Public Busi-
ness Corporation (ipbc) where the 
prime minister’s son Arthur Somare 
is the minister. However, Petromin 
Holdings withdrew the case after 
its board was threatened with being 
sacked. National Planning Minister 
Paul Tiensten slammed the legal chal-
lenge launched by Petromin Holdings 
against ipbc as the state’s nominee 
for the multibillion-dollar lng project 
(The National, 14 Nov 2008). The 
Parliament passed legislation to shut 
Petromin Holdings out completely 
and, in turn, empowered the ipbc as 
the State nominee to sign the deal 
with ipic.
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The government plans to keep 
proceeds from its direct equity par-
ticipation in the ExxonMobil-led lng 
project in a trust account outside of 
the budget. These funds would be used 
on development projects in line with 
the government’s long-term develop-
ment strategy (The National, 3 Dec 
2008).
In an unprecedented step in April, 
Isaac Lupari, the chief secretary to 
the government, was sacked after a 
National Executive Council meeting 
in Madang Province. Minister for 
Public Service Peter O’Neil said that 
the action was “in the best interest 
of the state” and necessary to move 
the country forward. Lupari had been 
brought over from Brussels where he 
was serving as the PNG ambassador 
to the European Union (EU) to replace 
Joshua Kalinoe as chief secretary. 
The removal of Lupari angered 
the Highlands members of Parlia-
ment. Southern Highlands Governor 
Anderson Agiru commented that the 
National Executive Council decision 
was a slap in the face of highland-
ers (The National, 29 April 2008). 
The government announced that it 
would bring forward legislation in the 
July session of Parliament to abolish 
the Offi ce of Chief Secretary as well 
as the Central Agencies Coordinat-
ing Committee. The government has 
started the process with the creation 
of ministerial sectoral committees in a 
proposed restructuring, following the 
dismissal of the chief secretary (The 
National, 30 May 2008).
The public service was also beset 
by a number of problems. A com-
mission of inquiry looking into the 
cases of fi nancial mismanagement and 
corruption at the Finance Department 
has on a number of occasions come 
to a standstill supposedly because of 
lack of funds. Complaints were made 
that the commission had been sitting 
on the inquiry and yet were being 
paid hefty fees without any inquiry 
reports for the last three years. Among 
the fi les was Chief Secretary to the 
Government Isaac Lupari’s claim 
against the state for breach of contract 
when he served as the head of vari-
ous government departments. In early 
April, Chairman Maurice Sheehan 
announced that the commission was 
ready to look into the Finance Depart-
ment’s payouts involving millions 
of kina made to claimants between 
1 January 2000 and 31 July 2006 
(during the period, one kina ranged 
from us$.26 to us$.34). The inquiry 
revealed that the government could 
have saved k63.46 million in payouts 
resulting in “deeds of release” and 
another k15.71 million under “default 
judgment” payouts. 
In a startling revelation early in 
February, National Planning Minister 
Paul Tiensten alleged that offi cers in 
Vulupindi Haus, the building that 
houses his department, were asking 
for 10 percent commission before 
processing checks and payments. 
He said that this 10 percent check-
 processing syndicate was operating in 
three departments—National Planning 
and Rural Development, Finance, and 
Treasury—implying that offi cers in 
the departments were involved (The 
National, 22 Feb 2008). Tiensten 
also stated that more than k3 billion 
from the 2006 and 2007 supplemen-
tary budgets was sitting idle in trust 
accounts in Waigani, managed by 
department heads. Despite all the 
mechanisms to facilitate a smooth and 
expedient implementation of pro-
grams, only 10 percent of the funds 
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had been drawn and expended to date. 
Tiensten argued that the system and 
bureaucracy continue to fail the gov-
ernment (The National, 9 Jan 2008).
The bureaucracy also came under 
severe attack from the government. 
Prime Minister Somare said that 
appropriations have been made in 
the budget, and that the problem was 
with lack of implementation by civil 
servants (The National, 7 Feb 2008). 
The national government described 
this bureaucratic failure as a “real 
nightmare.” Government priority pro-
grams in education, health, and law 
and order worth millions of kina have 
been rolled over for a number of years 
due to non-implementation, which has 
now become a source of real concern. 
This follows criticisms from a wide 
spectrum of society, in the light of gov-
ernment boasting about the economic 
boom and budget surpluses that are 
not reaching ordinary people. 
Toward the end of the year the 
bureaucracy came under another 
stinging attack from the University of 
Vudal Vice Chancellor Professor Philip 
Siaguru. During a graduation cere-
mony Professor Siaguru lamented that 
the k23 million Chinese government–
funded student dormitories and staff 
houses were still not occupied because 
the PNG government had not released 
k1.2 million for beds and wardrobes 
for the dormitories. Locating the 
problem in the corridors of Vulupindi 
Haus, he said he had been given the 
runaround by the departments of 
National Planning and Treasury since 
March (The National, 1 Dec 2008). 
In July the Post Courier reported 
that more than us$40 million was 
being held in a bank account in Sin-
gapore. The newspaper alleged that 
secret payments amounting to 2.1 
percent of the sales of log exports was 
accumulating in this account, kept 
by a minister, since 2002. Opposition 
Leader Sir Mekere Morauta called 
on the government to investigate the 
allegations, saying that if they were 
true, it represented “the most serious 
case of corruption that has come to 
light to date.” Sir Mekere said that 
the amount of money involved was 
serious and the situation demonstrated 
that senior members of the govern-
ment were using state institutions for 
personal gain. Corruption, therefore, 
according to Sir Mekere, has become 
systemic and institutionalized (The 
National, 3 July 2008).
Of similar magnitude was the 
reported us$30 million “Taiwan 
dollar diplomacy scandal.” The Post 
Courier fi rst reported in May that 
six Papua New Guineans allegedly 
received money from two Taiwanese 
middlemen and that National Plan-
ning Minister Paul Tiensten, who was 
then acting foreign affairs minister, 
allegedly signed a draft communiqué 
in September 2006 for Papua New 
Guinea to set up “full diplomatic rela-
tions” with Taiwan.
However, as it has done since 
independence in 1975, Papua New 
Guinea continues to recognize Beijing 
and the One China policy. Meanwhile, 
the Opposition and the PNG chapter 
of Transparency International (ti) 
have condemned the actions of those 
involved and are seeking assistance 
to establish the truth. The country 
also lost one of its staunch fi ghters of 
corruption, the ti-PNG chapter chair-
man, Mike Manning, who died of a 
heart attack. The ti-PNG board of 
directors appointed Peter Aitsi as the 
new chairman. 
In September, Benjamin Mul, the 
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member for North-Waghi, argued 
that the k2,017 fortnightly salary that 
members of Parliament receive was 
not enough to both support their fami-
lies and entertain people who come 
to them for money (The National, 22 
Sept 2008). Earlier in the year, Ken 
Fairweather, the member for Sumkar, 
appealed to the public, highlighting 
the fi nancial plight of parliamentar-
ians as a result of providing handouts 
to “bubus” (older family members) 
and their tribal entourage. PNG Trade 
Union Congress General Secretary 
John Paska slammed the moves to 
increase parliamentary wages and 
allowances, saying that this was the 
most “putrid and irresponsible” state-
ment coming out of Parliament when 
most ordinary citizens are suffering 
from high cost of goods and services. 
Meanwhile, the PNG Trade Union 
Congress has been pushing for an 
increase in minimum wages for work-
ers, saying that the current minimum 
wage of k37.20 per week is grossly 
inadequate, with minimum-wage 
workers and their families struggling 
to make a living. Most minimum-wage 
earners cannot afford education and 
health care for their children due to 
the lack of adequate information on 
how to budget for goods and services 
while raising and educating their 
children. With the cost of living hav-
ing increased dramatically, the trade 
union congress is proposing to the 
2008 board for the minimum wage to 
be set at k120.00 per week or k240.00 
per fortnight, a k40 increase over that 
proposed by the government (The 
National, 18 Dec 2008).
Despite some affi rmative action 
incentives for political parties to 
nominate women candidates, women’s 
representation in Parliament has not 
improved. Since independence only 
three women have managed to win a 
seat. Currently, the only woman par-
liamentarian, Dame Carol Kidu—the 
minister for community development 
and wife of the late chief justice, Sir 
Buri Kidu—is pushing for greater rep-
resentation of women in Parliament. 
Parliament recently endorsed a 
submission by Dame Kidu to bring 
in three women by 2009, using an 
amended constitutional provision for 
nominated seats. This will be the fi rst 
time in the history of the country for 
women to be nominated as represen-
tatives from the fl oor of Parliament. 
However, Professor John Nonggorr, 
a constitutional lawyer, criticized the 
move, saying that there were serious 
constitutional fl aws in the initiative, 
one being that it may be challenged as 
sexually discriminatory (Post Courier, 
22 Jan 2009). 
The organic integrity law  (olippac) 
was introduced by the Morauta gov-
ernment in 2003 to promote stabil-
ity in Parliament. However, certain 
provisions dealing with the rights and 
conscience of elected members were 
restricted because they have to work 
along party lines. The law was chal-
lenged by Western Province Gover-
nor Bob Danaya. The three crucial 
problems with the law are that it (1) 
restricts the ability of members from 
exercising their votes in Parliament; 
(2) prevents them from resigning from 
political parties; and (3) prevents them 
from exercising their votes in accor-
dance with their conscience and in 
the interests of their constituents (The 
National, 11 Nov 2008). 
While speaking at a People’s Party 
convention, John Bishop, the director 
of funding and disclosure of the Offi ce 
of the Integrity of Political Parties and 
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Candidates, revealed that according to 
the organic integrity law, companies 
are permitted to fund political parties 
and that companies and individuals 
should not be afraid to donate money 
to support political parties (The 
National, 29 April 2008). This may 
surprise some who hold the view that 
political parties and candidates should 
not accept external funding because of 
the danger of being unduly infl uenced 
by big businesses and corporations.
In August, Papua New Guinea 
fi nally was given the opportunity to 
participate in the Pacifi c seasonal 
worker scheme in Australia. Under a 
three-year pilot program, up to 2,500 
workers from Papua New Guinea, 
Kiribati, Tonga, and Vanuatu will be 
employed for up to seven months in 
the horticulture industry. 
PNG Foreign Affairs Minister Sam 
Abal and his Australian counterpart, 
Stephen Smith, also announced the 
renaming of the Enhanced Coopera-
tion Program, through which Aus-
tralian advisers were being seconded 
to PNG government departments. 
It will now be called the Strongim 
Gavman project and will help boost 
programs between the two coun-
tries. The announcement was made 
at the closure of the PNG-Australia 
Ministerial Forum in Madang. Also 
during the forum, National Planning 
Minister Paul Tiensten announced 
the Long Term Development Plan, a 
twenty-year initiative, incorporating 
the fi ve-year medium-term plans. The 
long-term plan would run from 2010 
to 2030 and would stress economic 
independence, economic growth by 10 
percent, and higher quality education 
(The National, 24 April 2008).
In November, Papua New Guinea 
hosted the 16th African Caribbean 
Pacifi c–European Union joint parlia-
mentary assembly. In the same month, 
most of the coastal and island prov-
inces were hit by rising sea tides as a 
result of La Niña. Reports of damage 
caused by sea swells came in from 
the provinces of Sandaun, East Sepik, 
Manus, New Ireland, Bougainville, 
and Morobe. The government immedi-
ately provided k50 million in disaster 
relief to assist the stricken provinces. 
In its 2008 report, the international 
human rights group Amnesty Interna-
tional described Papua New Guinea 
as having high levels of crime, and its 
police as having neither the ability nor 
the will to guarantee security to its 
public (The National, 30 May 2008). 
This was further corroborated in Sep-
tember in a Washington DC foreign 
policy publication, stating that Port 
Moresby is among the top fi ve murder 
capitals of the world (Foreign Policy 
2008). Police Commissioner Gari Baki 
was quick to rebut these statements, 
but drew little support from the public 
in light of the increasing crime in the 
nation’s capital. 
Many unanswered questions remain 
concerning the major scandals and 
the government’s perpetual denial 
and sluggishness in investigating and 
prosecuting those involved. The cases 
outlined in this review, if unresolved, 
will continue to haunt the Somare 
government long after Sir Michael 
retires from the political scene. 
solomon kantha
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Solomon Islands
For Solomon Islands, 2008 was domi-
nated by the establishment of a new 
government, the mending of diplo-
matic relations, an attempt to improve 
governance processes, and the continu-
ing challenges associated with post-
confl ict development and a struggling 
economy. For most Solomon Islanders 
there was an expectation that political 
leadership, especially at the national 
level, would improve. This was seen as 
the core of the country’s challenges.
In late 2007, the Manasseh Soga-
vare–led Grand Coalition for Change 
(gcc) government, which had been in 
power since April 2006, was ousted in 
a motion of no confi dence. Many of 
the cabinet ministers in the Sogavare 
government withdrew their support 
amid controversies over the appoint-
ment of Julian Moti to the position 
of attorney general and Jahir Khan 
as commissioner of police. In late 
2006, the appointment of Moti, an 
Australian citizen wanted for child 
sex charges, strained relations with 
Australia and led to a diplomatic row 
that saw the declaration of the Austra-
lian High Commissioner to Solomon 
Islands Patrick Cole as persona non 
grata in the Solomon Islands. This 
and other issues, including concerns 
about the gcc government’s “dictato-
rial” leadership style, led to Sogavare’s 
ouster. 
Sogavare was replaced in December 
2007 by Dr Derek Sikua, a longtime 
public servant who was in his fi rst 
term as a member of Parliament. 
Sikua formed a Coalition for 
National Unity and Rural Advance-
ment (c-nura) government that faced 
many challenges, including how to 
deliver services and salvage relations 
with neighbors like Australia, New 
Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. Yet 
expectations were high for improved 
governance under c-nura leadership. 
The failure of the Sogavare-led gov-
ernment to deliver on its “Bottom Up 
Approach” policy, the controversial 
manner in which it fi lled important 
positions, and its mishandling of dip-
lomatic relations had caused wide-
spread skepticism in the government, 
and placed pressure on the c-nura 
government to turn the tides of public 
opinion. There was also a dire need to 
salvage Solomon Islands’ reputation 
in the international arena, improve the 
delivery of social services, and provide 
credible leadership. 
In January 2008, the c-nura 
government launched its policy state-
ment, outlining a broad number of 
issues that it hoped to address. One of 
the fi rst things the Sikua-led govern-
ment did was dismiss Julian Moti as 
attorney general and replace him with 
Gabriel Suri as acting attorney general. 
This was part of an attempt to give 
credibility to the Offi ce of the Attor-
ney General and to mend relations 
with neighboring countries, especially 
Australia. The commissioner of police, 
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Jahir Khan, who had been appointed 
under similarly controversial circum-
stances, was also asked to resign.
Immediately after assuming offi ce, 
the Sikua-led government set out to 
mend and strengthen relations with 
governments of neighboring countries 
and donor agencies, which had been 
strained under the previous adminis-
tration. As part of the government’s 
efforts to mend relations, in January 
2008 Sikua visited Australia, New 
Zealand, and Papua New Guinea, 
and met with his counterparts in these 
countries. This was vital because 
Solomon Islands depended on Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and other aid 
donors to fi nance its development 
programs. In its 2009 national budget, 
for example, Solomon Islands develop-
ment expenditure of si$2.7 billion was 
to be funded entirely by development 
partners. (One Solomon Islands dollar 
is the equivalent of approximately 
us$.14.)
At the national level, the prime 
minister wanted to reassure the 
country of his government’s commit-
ments as stated in its policy statement. 
Therefore he visited Malaita and 
the Western Provinces and met with 
provincial leaders. This was a move 
designed to familiarize himself with 
issues that were pertinent to those 
provinces and at the same time share 
with provincial leaders the national 
government’s visions and development 
policies. 
For Australia, the advent of a new 
Solomon Islands government pro-
vided an opportunity to mend and 
strengthen bilateral relations. Austra-
lia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen 
Smith made his inaugural visit to Solo-
mon Islands to review the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(ramsi) in February 2008. During the 
visit Smith reiterated Australia’s com-
mitment to provide “an environment 
of peace and stability and security 
to enable the Solomon Islands to 
get back on its feet again in terms of 
building itself as a nation” (Pacnews, 
22 Feb 2008). Smith’s February visit 
was complemented by the inaugural 
meeting of the Pacifi c Islands Forum 
Ministerial Standing Committee on 
ramsi. The committee was tasked 
with overseeing the Australian-led 
assistance mission. During that meet-
ing, the committee agreed that ramsi 
would now report directly to the Solo-
mon Islands government. This, it was 
envisaged, would ensure that ramsi 
post-confl ict reconstruction efforts 
were aligned with the Solomon Islands 
government’s development plans and 
priorities. 
Australia Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd visited Solomon Islands in 
March 2008. The Labour Government 
in Australia, which came to power in 
2007, had pledged to work coopera-
tively with its Pacifi c Island neighbors. 
Rudd reaffi rmed his government’s 
commitment, saying that relations 
with Pacifi c Island countries would be 
based on partnership: “I will use the 
visit to underscore Australia’s com-
mitment to work in partnership with 
our friends and neighbours in Papua 
New Guinea and Solomon Islands on 
regional challenges, including eco-
nomic sustainability, effective develop-
ment and climate change” (Pacnews, 
3 March 2008). 
Meanwhile, Taiwan was also keen 
to ensure that a change in government 
did not mean a change in Solomon 
Islands policy to accord diplomatic 
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recognition to Taiwan. Consequently, 
Taiwanese Vice President Annette 
Lu visited Honiara in January 2008. 
During that visit, Prime Minister Sikua 
told Ms Lu that Solomon Islands 
would continue to support Taiwan’s 
bid for membership in the United 
Nations and defend its interests at the 
international level (Pacnews, 4 Feb 
2008). In March, Dr Sikua visited 
Taiwan, where he met the Taiwan-
ese president, vice president, and 
government ministers. In a show of 
goodwill, the Taiwanese government 
offered to fi nance the completion of 
the multimillion-dollar Stage 2 of 
the Solomon Islands National Parlia-
ment Building Project. Stages 2 and 
3 of the building project included the 
construction of offi ces for members 
of Parliament as well as amenities for 
recreational activities, such as a gym, 
swimming pool, and tennis courts 
(Pacnews, 4 March 2008). The offer 
was made on the condition that Solo-
mon Islands agreed to host the 2009 
Taiwan–Pacifi c Allies Summit, which it 
agreed to do. In the meantime, Taiwan 
continued to provide about si$50 
million annually, to fund the Rural 
Constituency Development Fund, as 
well as provide fi nancial support for 
the agriculture and education sectors. 
Despite its success in normalizing 
relations with Australia and New Zea-
land, the Sikua-led government was 
criticized for its moves to strengthen 
bilateral ties with Iran, a country that 
US President George W Bush had 
branded as a member of the “axis of 
evil.” Opposition leader Manasseh 
Sogavare condemned the move: “I’m 
shocked that a government that boasts 
itself to believe in the principles that 
other members of the international 
community believe in—democracy, 
good governance, anti-terrorism—can 
entertain a country that works against 
every principles that all right thinking 
governments of the world believe” 
(Pacnews, 29 Oct 2008). The c-nura 
government defended its plan to sign a 
bilateral cooperation agreement with 
Iran. Foreign Affairs Minister William 
Haomae called for Iran’s assistance 
in dam construction, training skilled 
personnel in oil and gas industries, 
and trade. 
As of this writing, Solomon Islands 
has yet to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran, although it has 
signed a cooperative memorandum to 
allowed the two countries to explore 
specifi c cooperative arrangements, 
including the possibility of formaliz-
ing diplomatic relations. Iran and the 
Solomon Islands are both members 
of the Group of Developing Coun-
tries at the United Nations. Hence, 
the cooperative memorandum was 
seen as within the spirit of “South-
South Cooperation” (Pacnews, 31 Oct 
2008). Meanwhile, Israel Ambassador 
Michael Ronan, during his visit in 
November, commented on Solomon 
Islands’ relations with Iran, saying 
that his country was “not worried at 
all [and] that Solomon Islands is an 
independent country and is at liberty 
to choose its diplomatic friends” (Pac-
news, 28 Nov 2008). 
Within the Pacifi c Islands region, 
the Sikua-led government announced 
the establishment of the Solomon 
Islands High Commission Offi ce in Fiji 
in August. However, by March 2009 
the offi ce was still without a high com-
missioner. Meanwhile, two impor-
tant international organizations, the 
World Bank and Asian Development 
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Bank, opened their offi ces in Honiara 
in 2008 and expressed the desire to 
work closely with the Solomon Islands 
government. 
As the government attempted to 
mend and strengthen its international 
relations, in Honiara a group of 
people from Malaita demanded com-
pensation for an allegedly offensive 
note left near the Honiara Magistrates 
Court. The group threatened to start a 
violent demonstration if the national 
government did not meet their com-
pensation demands. The government 
convened a series of meetings with 
the Malaita provincial premier, the 
minister for home affairs, the Lord 
Mayor of Honiara, and various Malai-
tan chiefs. The cabinet eventually 
paid approximately si$42,000 to the 
group in January 2008 (Pacnews, 28 
Jan 2008). However, many people felt 
that this was a political ploy orches-
trated by disgruntled supporters of the 
former Grand Coalition for Change 
government to destabilize the c-nura 
government. Many also felt that the 
compensation payment perpetuated 
the mentality that any group could 
demand and receive compensation 
from government without the due 
process of law. 
There were other domestic chal-
lenges such as the rehabilitation of 
communities in the Western Solomons 
that had been affected by the tsu-
nami of April 2007. It was revealed 
that a year after the tsunami many of 
those affected had not yet received 
assistance, despite millions of dol-
lars allocated for rehabilitation. Both 
provincial and national authorities 
expressed concern about the admin-
istration of relief assistance. Gover-
nor-General Sir Nathaniel Waena, 
for example, said that he regretted 
the “serious negligence” shown by 
responsible authorities and relief agen-
cies toward the tsunami victims. Many 
were still living in tents a year after the 
tsunami destroyed their homes. The 
leaders of the Titiana community who 
were among the worst hit said that the 
tents they were living in were intended 
to be used for only three months, 
and that after a year of exposure to 
the elements most of the tents were 
unfi t for further use. In response, the 
prime minister announced that the 
governments of Australia and New 
Zealand would provide si$18 million 
for reconstruction efforts (Pacnews, 2 
April 2008). 
In the meantime, the leaders of the 
Western and Guadalcanal provinces 
expressed concern about the adminis-
tration of funds allocated for develop-
ment more generally. The two provin-
cial premiers jointly renewed calls for 
the c-nura government to increase 
grants to the Western and Guadalca-
nal provinces in view of the fact that 
they host many of the development 
projects from which the national 
government generates revenue. They 
also called on the national government 
to give priority to the proposed federal 
constitution that would facilitate the 
establishment of a federal system of 
government. They urged that the draft 
federal constitution be presented to 
Parliament for debate in 2009 (sibc 
News, 22 Dec 2008). During the fi rst 
session of Parliament on April 2008, 
the prime minister revealed that the 
fi nal draft of the federal constitution 
would be completed and delivered to 
the government in July 2009. Sikua 
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said that a Constitutional Congress 
and an Eminent Persons Advisory 
Council were working on fi nal-
izing the draft federal constitution. 
The  congress consists of provincial 
nominees and national representatives, 
while the council is made up of some 
prominent citizens, including for-
mer governor-generals, some former 
politicians, and representatives from a 
wide cross- section of society, including 
women and youth.
During the second sitting of Parlia-
ment in July 2008 a motion to review 
the Facilitation of International 
Assistance Act was passed. Sikua said 
that the motion sought approval from 
Parliament to refer the International 
Assistance Notice to the Foreign 
Relations Committee for inquiry. The 
review looked at “the composition 
of the assisting countries,” “public 
purpose,” and the “agreement which 
covers the operations and activities” 
(npsi 2008a). Sikua indicated that the 
Foreign Relations Committee would 
also explore ways in which ramsi 
could develop programs that are 
aligned with Solomon Islands’ plans 
and aspirations. 
During the July meeting of Parlia-
ment, the Opposition put forth a 
motion of no confi dence in the prime 
minister. The motion was convinc-
ingly defeated by 39 votes to 8—an 
overwhelming show of confi dence 
in Dr Sikua’s leadership. Opposi-
tion leader Manasseh Sogavare, in 
accepting the defeat of the motion, 
said that the Opposition was satisfi ed 
because it was able to raise issues that 
it wanted the government to address. 
Sogavare said that the motion was not 
an attempt to regain power; rather, it 
was meant to remind government of 
the need to address outstanding issues 
facing the country (Pacnews, 12 Aug 
2008). 
At the fi nal annual sitting of the 
Parliament in November 2008, a 
national budget worth approximately 
us$53 million was passed (rnzi, 10 
Dec 2008). This was the country’s big-
gest budget since independence. “The 
2009 budget comprises an estimated 
recurrent expenditure of about one-
point-six billion dollars, and a devel-
opment budget of about two-point-
two billion dollars. [The] Finance 
Minister, Mr. Rini, said the govern-
ment is expected to collect more than 
one-point-six billion dollars in domes-
tic revenue and additional support 
of more than one-point-seven billion 
dollars from development partners” 
(sto, 11 Dec 2008; for budget details, 
see npsi 2008b).
There were challenges in fi nanc-
ing the budget. Although government 
was expecting to fund 100 percent of 
its recurrent budget from domestic 
revenue, the forestry sector, which 
accounted for 66.6 percent of total 
export revenue in 2007, is forecasted 
to decline by 2010 (cbsi 2008). The 
Central Bank of Solomon Islands 
(cbsi) warned that the Solomon 
Islands could lose its largest export 
industry in forestry if the govern-
ment did not take immediate actions 
to reduce the rate of logging, assist 
reforestation projects, and develop 
the non-logging sector to cushion the 
economy given the potential decline in 
export revenue. 
Meanwhile the Gold Ridge gold 
mine, another major development 
project, was facing numerous chal-
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lenges. Unresolved issues such as land 
acquisition, a resettlement scheme, 
the tailings dam, landowner demands, 
and political indecision led to delays in 
getting the mine back into production 
(cbsi 2008). Since 2005 the company 
concentrated primarily on construct-
ing housing and security infrastruc-
ture, resolving outstanding land issues, 
and raising fi nancing overseas. In Feb-
ruary 2009, the Gold Ridge landown-
ers expressed concern about the delay 
in reopening the mine and requested 
the developer to provide an explana-
tion: “Australia Solomon Gold has 
an obligation to tell this nation why 
they haven’t started actual mining at 
the gold ridge.” They added, “Land-
owners of gold ridge want a serious 
and reputable investor in return for 
sacrifi cing our land for this national 
project amidst these trying times when 
the world is facing the global fi nancial 
crisis” (sto, 25 Feb 2009). 
While these discussions were tak-
ing place on Guadalcanal, substantial 
progress was made on the proposed 
development of Auluta Palm Oil 
Project on Malaita. On 27 Febru-
ary 2009, an agreement was signed 
between the commissioner of lands 
and Auluta Basin tribal groups, which 
saw the conversion of tribal land into 
a perpetual estate lease arrangement. 
Each of the two main tribes received 
si$150,000 as a token of appreciation 
from the government. This project, if 
successful, would be the fi rst major 
development on Malaita.
In the services sector, the cost of 
telecommunication continued to 
rise. This was said to be one of the 
major disincentives to private sector 
expansion. A strike by workers of 
Our Telekom in June further affected 
services and caused security concerns 
(Pacnews, 19 June 2008). Acting 
Police Commissioner Peter Marshall 
warned that essential communication 
services were affected because of the 
industrial dispute. He made the warn-
ing after the emergency 999 phone 
number and standard phone lines to 
some police posts stopped working 
(Pacnews, 26 June 2008). 
Law and order improved signifi -
cantly in 2008 with the presence of 
ramsi. This was due in part to the 
recruitment of new police offi cers and 
the fact that most guns have been 
taken away from communities. In spite 
of this progress, ensuring long-term 
security remains a challenge as there 
is an evident increase in house break-
ins in Honiara, in the production and 
sale of home-brewed alcohol (known 
locally as kwaso), in the use of drugs 
like marijuana, as well as in unem-
ployment and other social problems. 
The police continued to investi-
gate allegations of abuse of public 
offi ce by some political leaders. Three 
members of Parliament (mps) were 
charged in 2008. In April, former 
East Honiara mp Charles Dausabea 
was found guilty of conversion and 
sentenced to eighteen months in jail. 
In court, Magistrate Michael Scott 
said he was satisfi ed with the crown 
case that Dausabea fraudulently 
converted si$40,000 of govern-
ment funds, entrusted to him for the 
church, to his personal bank account. 
Dausabea appealed the magistrate’s 
decision, but the High Court ruled 
against him. Dausabea subsequently 
lost his seat in Parliament (Pacnews, 
23 April 2008). Central Guadalcanal 
mp Peter Shannel also lost his parlia-
mentary seat after being sentenced to 
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a nine-month jail term in July 2008. 
The Honiara Magistrates Court found 
Shannel guilty of carrying a dangerous 
weapon in a restricted area (Pacnews, 
27 Aug 2008). Similarly, the High 
Court found the former prime minis-
ter and member for Savo-Russels, Sir 
Allan Kemakeza, guilty of demanding 
money with menace, intimidation, and 
larceny. These crimes were committed 
during the ethnic tension when he was 
prime minister. Despite sentencing Sir 
Allan to eighteen months in jail, the 
court initially ordered that he serve 
only fi ve months imprisonment. The 
court then ordered that Sir Allan serve 
only two months, with the remaining 
three months suspended. In Septem-
ber 2008 Sir Allan was jailed, and 
consequently, he lost his Savo-Russell 
Islands parliamentary seat (Pacnews, 3 
Sept 2008). 
Although ramsi contributed sub-
stantially to improved law and order, 
in early October 2008 a People’s 
Survey conducted by the Australian 
National University compared atti-
tudes about ramsi in 2008 with those 
in 2007. The survey showed a drop 
in support for ramsi’s presence in the 
country from 90 to 86 percent. The 
number of undecided people increased 
from 4 percent in 2007 to 6 percent 
in 2008. In Malaita, the support for 
ramsi declined from 87 percent to 
76 percent, while on Guadalcanal, 
the support for ramsi decreased by 3 
percent, from 97 percent in to 94 per-
cent in 2008 (Pacnews, 17 Oct 2008). 
The survey was conducted in Central, 
Guadalcanal, Malaita, Western, and 
Honiara provinces. A total of 4,304 
Solomon Islanders were interviewed 
and seventy-four focus group discus-
sions were held. 
By December, Solomon Islanders, 
like people elsewhere, slowed down 
and celebrated Christmas and New 
Year with their families and rela-
tives. It was also a time when parents 
became anxious about their children’s 
school fees and other back-to-school 
expenses for the next year. To the 
relief of some parents, the c-nura 
government launched its fee-free 
 education policy in January 2009. 
At the offi cial launch of the fee-free 
education, the prime minister said 
that his “government has made it one 
of its fl agship policies to provide fee-
free education in the Solomon Islands 
[and] today marks the implementation 
of this historic policy initiative.” He 
added that apart from the subsidized 
school fees, the government would 
continue to give other, additional 
grants in support of its fee-free basic 
education policy. nzaid, Taiwan, 
and the Solomon Islands government 
 contributed funds to implement the 
basic education policy (sto, 15 Jan 
2009). 
In terms of livelihood, an increas-
ing proportion of Solomon Island-
ers continue to experience hardships 
in the face of increasing infl ation, 
weakening national currency, looming 
negative impacts of the global fi nan-
cial crisis, and the negative impacts of 
natural disaster for which the country 
is highly vulnerable. After one year 
in offi ce, the c-nura government is 
providing fee-free basic education, 
has normalized diplomatic rela-
tions, explored options for establish-
ing political stability, strengthened 
accountability institutions, and signed 
a land-lease agreement with land-
owners on Malaita, which paved the 
way for developing a major palm oil 
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industry. Whether or not the c-nura 
government will remain in power 
until the next general elections, 
 scheduled for April 2010, remains 
to be seen. But one thing is certain, 
Solomon Islands needs a good gov-
ernment, the com mitment of its 
citizens, and the continued support 
of its development partners in order 
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